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Abstract 
We draw on institutional isomorphism perspective to develop a conceptual framework which 
uncovers how emerging market MNEs manage institutional tensions and complexity in 
governance regulations, within and across economic environments. Using a sample of 400 
firm-year observations (2011-2015) from Nigeria, we show foreign directorship and cross-
listing as significant avenues for governance isomorphism. MNEs employ these mechanisms 
to manage and reconcile foreign and Nigerian CG regulations whilst overcoming institutional 
weaknesses at home. Specifically, governance isomorphism leads to improvement of home 
country CG disclosures practices because of associated linkages with international CG 
systems through cross-listing and employment of multinational directors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-serving managerial behaviour were largely masked 
by economic growth and development. As such, the concept of corporate governance (CG) received 
limited attention within business and policy discussions (Cadbury, 2000). This period was 
characterized by significant managerial use of creative accounting to show favourable performance 
(Dedman, 2002). Yet the failure of firms such as the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(BCCI), Polly Peck, the Maxwell Companies and Penn Central evidence the weaknesses of the then 
existing governance systems (Puffer and McCarthy, 2003, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Veasey, 1992). 
Further, the rapid increase in directors pay in the mid-  led to serious concerns about 
unconstraint managerial discretion at the expense of shareholders value maximization (Dedman, 
2002, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  The balance of power principally was in the hands of executive 
managers. Disssatisfied investors could only react to managerial behaviour and misalignment of 
interest by selling their shares to express lack of confidence in the firm (Cadbury, 2000).  
Consequently, the stock market was the principal solution to poor governance.  
 
These weaknesses attracted the interest of various stakeholders including investors, policy 
makers, boards, financial markets and international organisations (e.g. IMF and World Bank). This  
placed CG at the centre of  regulatory initiatives (Cadbury, 2000, Cuomo et al., 2016, Dedman, 2002, 
Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001, Zattoni and Van Ees, 2012). This led to development of governance 
codes as guiding principles to ensure and clarify the responsibilities of boards and accountability of 
firms.  The publication of Cadbury report in 1992 saw a surge in CG regulations and guidelines across 
the globe (Areneke, 2018).  Since then, CG regulations have been utilized as popular standards to 
encourage firms to increase accountability and transparency (Cuomo et al., 2016).  CG regulations 
are expected to act as safeguards against managerial inefficiencies, misappropriation of firm 
resources in addition to promoting and serving societal needs.  
 
After the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, many African economies and other emerging 
countries also realised they were not immune to corporate failures (Rwegasira, 2000). Hence, we 
have witnessed a surge in CG reforms across many emerging African economies in the last two 
decades.  It is therefore unsurprising that good CG has been articulated as pre-requisite to reducing 
corrupt practices by many African governments, e.g. Kenya, Cameroon, Nigeria and Zambia and a 
host of other African countries.  Except for South Africa, many African economies developed CG 
codes after the year 2000.  Due to historical and institutional differences, the level of development of 
CG codes differs from one country to another.  In fact, CG codes in Africa and other emerging 
economies have been customised to be responsive to local conditions, prevailing within each country 
whilst maintaining global benchmarks ( for detailed review of  divergence and convergence of 
governnace codes in Africa and other emerging economies, see  Schiehll and Martins, 2016, Cuomo 
et al., 2016, Aguilera and Cuervo Cazurra, 2009).  
 
  Many firms in Africa and other emerging economies have embraced  CG regulations as a way 
of improving CG practices, attract cheaper capital and reassure investors of managerial commitment 
to maximizing firm value (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008). Some of the CG practices undertaken by 
firms to improve their CG profile includes: hiring talented directors, enhancing financial transparency 
and disclosure, or even developing internal CG guidelines, in addition to the country-level CG 
regulations (Del Bosco and Misani, 2016). Besides, various firms have in an attempt to raise their 
CG profile, also hired non-native directors from host countries or even traded their shares in markets 
with robust CG systems (Del Bosco and Misani, 2016, Temouri et al., 2016). However, the process 
of cross-listing and or cross border operations subjects firms to different national institutional systems 
and varying CG environments (Valentino et al., 2018). This is not to mention the level of CG 
development differs from one country to another (Gaur and Delios, 2015). This is due to differences 
in the institutional environments of individual countries, including local norms and culture, legal and 
regulatory climate, and state of economic development (Fainshmidt et al., 2016, Hearn, 2015, Sun et 
al., 2015).  
 
Accordingly, the introduction of CG reforms in Africa and other emerging economies has also 
attracted considerable interest from scholars. However,  majority of existing studies  have used  firms 
with operations within a single country to examine CG-firm financial performance nexus, mainly 
focussing on internal CG mechanisms such as board structure, executive compensation and CG 
disclosure practices (e.g. Abor, 2007, Barako et al., 2006, Ntim et al., 2012b, Sanda et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, there is scant literature concerning the CG practices of African, and other emerging 
markets International 
Business (IB) literature suggests that MNEs are likely to adopt isomorphism strategies (Meyer et al., 
2009, Salomon and Wu, 2012).  To the best of our knowledge, no study has previously explored how 
emerging market MNEs employ isomorphic strategies in their CG compliance practices in home and 
host countries. Addressing this knowledge gap is particularly relevant for emerging African 
economies where isomorphic governance strategies can help MNEs overcome global disadvantage 
owing to home country institutional weaknesses.  
 
 Drawing from the preceding discussions, there is a need to understand how emerging market 
MNEs reconcile and engage in home country CG practices despite their multinational operations in 
different institutional environments which may influence such practices. Undoubtedly, there are costs 
and benefits associated with different CG structures optimised for the benefit of individual firms. 
Also, significant variation in national financial systems or structures in the host and home context 
makes it challenging for MNEs to manage governance practices compared to single country firms. 
Using Nigerian (we discuss the peculiarity of Nigeria context in a later section) MNEs as an example, 
this paper addresses this dearth in research. We examine how emerging market MNEs strategically 
appoint foreign directors and cross-list in foreign markets to manage institutional governance 
complexities and in the process improve home country governance compliance through institutional 
isomorphism (or governance isomorphism).   Institutional isomorphism leads to diffusion of good 
CG practices from countries with the most efficient enforcement of governance guidelines to those 
with weaker enforcement.  
 
Specifically, emerging market firms operating across different countries encounter idiosyncratic 
institutional environments (Carney et al., 2018, Mingo et al., 2018). These environments may have 
inconsistent formal laws and informal norms (Berkowitz et al., 2003). Hence, it is important to 
understand how such inconsistencies within the institutional environments of home and host 
countries, impacts the ability of MNEs to fulfil expectations of their stakeholders (i.e. shareholders, 
state, competitors, local communities, consumers and public) in their various countries of operation.  
We argue that, emerging markets MNEs encounter two types of governance problems, which 
underpin the theoretical and practical relevance of this research.   
 
First, they operate in countries with varied normative governance institutions (institutional 
duality) and are required to comply with governance guidelines in these countries (governance 
duality). As an instance, requirements to increase accountability by putting in place specific 
governance structures in a host country may be costlier (cheaper) than requirements in the home 
country. For example, a Nigeria MNE with operations in UK will need to balance the requirement 
for board and audit committee independence. Nigeria CG code requires firms to have one independent 
director without a requirement for audit committee independence. Whereas, UK 2010 combine code 
requires majority of non-executive directors to be independent board members and three members of 
audit committee should be independent from the firm. This suggests higher cost in recruitment of 
independent directors to meet the UK CG regulations compared to Nigerian governance regulations. 
Therefore, MNEs need to manage these differences in governance requirements. They can choose 
not to comply with the more demanding and costly governance guidelines in the host country (e.g. in 
the UK and USA). This will result to a trade-off of legitimacy for cost minimisation. Conversely, 
they can choose legitimacy by leveraging internal (e.g. foreign directors) and external (cross-listing) 
governance mechanisms to select an optimal governance structure which minimises cost. This may 
lead to adoption of isomorphic governance practices across different economic environments.  
 
Second, within the home country, formal governance institutions may contrast with traditional 
institutions governing the management of firms  (Berkowitz et al., 2003). While  the former can 
encourage good governance practices, weak enforcement (institutional void) (Khanna et al., 2006) 
reinforces the latter and hence both co-exist.  Nigeria is noted for strong informal institutional 
practices such as  corruption and elitism (Adegbite, 2015, Adegbite et al., 2012, Adegbite and 
Nakajima, 2012, Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016). For example, recent evidence from Nigeria shows 
that institutional voids encourage  elites to is 
antithetical to initiatives for good CG practices (Nakpodia and Adegbite, 2018). We contend that such 
practices limits governance transparency and may affect the perception, reputation and long-terms 
goals of MNEs in their international operations. More so, these informal practices are detrimental to 
African MNEs with operations in host countries with robust CG systems. For example, corruption 
charges in the home country may impact negatively on market valuation and reputation of MNEs in 
host countries (e.g. UK and USA).  Therefore, emerging market MNEs must develop strategies to 
manage these differences between formal and traditional rules governing corporate practices.  
 
The focus of this paper is to address how emerging market MNEs manage and mitigate the 
discussed institutional tensions using governance compliance/disclosure practices in the home 
country as a characterization of their behaviors. We theorize how emerging market MNEs adopt 
institutional isomorphism practices across home and host countries and critically examine their 
practical relevance for MNEs. We argue that emerging market MNEs manage and mitigate 
institutional tensions in governance regulations by implementing institutional isomorphism strategies 
that leads to diffusion of good governance practices from the country with the most efficient 
enforcement of normative guidelines to the country with weak enforcement. We show isomorphism 
of governance practices is diffused through two governance strategies  foreign directorship (internal 
mechanism) and cross-listing (external mechanism). Accordingly, we anticipate MNEs use these two 
mechanisms to overcome institutional voids and reconcile differences which may emerge between 
home and host country governance requirements. Building on this, we examine how MNEs listed in 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSX) overcome institutional voids and governance duality by 
managing, engaging, reconciling and optimising CG practices as required by the Nigerian Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) 2011 code of good CG practices. 
 
We argue that cross-listing (external governance mechanism) promotes governance 
isomorphism by channelling robust governance regulations from host countries to home countries 
through bonding.  Much of the literature on bonding hypothesis is focussed on the economic benefits 
of cross-listing ( e.g. Lang et al., 2003, Lel and Miller, 2008, Miller, 1999, Reese and Weisbach, 
2002). However, literature on whether bonding leads to isomorphism of governance practices 
between home and host countries is scant. More so, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no 
attempt to directly incorporate CG and IB approaches to cross-listing as an avenue for MNEs 
governance isomorphism which leads to diffusion of good governance compliance practices to 
emerging economies.  
 
Specifically, we pursue a different approach to examine bonding hypothesis through an 
investigation of the direct impact of cross-listing on CG disclosure practices of emerging market 
MNEs. We argue that emerging market MNEs overcome home country institutional voids and 
governance duality challenges between host and home governance institutions, by selecting to cross-
list and bond with CG practices from countries with the most efficient governance institutions. 
Moreover, we show that cross-listing is an effective means of reconciling governance standards 
between host and home countries and transferring modern governance practices from countries with 
strong governance regulations and enforcement to countries with weak governance enforcement. We 
contend that this strategy strengthens emerging market MNEs international competition in the global 
markets. Further, the benefits accruing from cross-listing of MNEs (i.e. enhanced monitoring, 
shareholder value maximisation, increase in scrutiny and monitoring) as proposed by bonding 
hypothesis, suggests that emerging market MNEs use this strategy to improve CG practices in the 
home country. By taking advantage of foreign CG listing regulations, firm-level CG quality and 
disclosures are enhanced through governnace isomophism.    
 
Besides, we further observe that not all emerging market MNEs are cross-listed due to the high 
costs associated with cross-listing. As such, we examine the presence of foreign/non-native directors 
(multinational directors) within the boards of both cross-listed and non-cross-listed MNEs as an 
important strategic node of isomorphism between national and global CG practices. Prior IB literature 
suggests there are varied reasons why MNEs employ directors of different nationalities. For instance, 
 found that heterogeneous ownership, including the presence of 
foreign shareholders, and scope of firms  market operations were the main reasons why firms employ 
directors of different nationalities. Similarly, firms with large business segments and multinational 
operations tend to appoint directors of different nationalities to indicate to shareholders firm 
commitment to reducing external dependencies, liability of foreignness  (LOF) and secure valuable 
resources . This can also be interpreted as a strategic behaviour 
aimed at overcoming domestic competition for scarce resources in the home country.  
 
Despite these helpful contributions, extant literature has been silent on how MNEs strategically 
recruit foreign directors to resolve their governance duality problem and mitigate institutional voids. 
We extend prior studies and provide new evidence to fill this lacuna in IB and CG research. We argue 
that, MNEs recruit foreign directors to enhance governance isomorphism through diffusion of 
governance regulations and enforcement from countries with strong governance implementation to 
those with weak enforcement. MNEs also employ foreign  due to their broader and deeper 
knowledge emanating from their heterogeneous origins. This comprises diverse socio-economic, 
institutional, political, cultural, business and technical/professional backgrounds. These attributes 
avail foreign directors with the skills and knowledge to impact on governance disclosure practices in 
the home country. Hence, for our second proxy of internationalisation, we define multinational 
directors (MND) as board members who are non-natives of the firm  These directors 
sit on the boards of MNEs in the home country and represent the multinational presence of those 
firms in host countries. 
 
 Using these two variables  MND and cross-listing  as proxies for internationalisation, we test 
whether they have a significant impact on CG disclosure/compliance practices of emerging market 
MNEs using data from Nigeria. In doing so, we provide evidence on how MNEs engage, 
reconcile and transmit international CG practices to emerging economies in addition to bypassing 
institutional voids at home. We also demonstrate the crucial role performed by non-native directors 
and cross-listing of firms as conduits for transmitting international best practices of CG into emerging 
economies which improves national CG practices. Therefore, our research makes several 
contributions to CG and IB scholarship.  
 
First, we contribute to existing literature on CG and IB by drawing on institutional isomorphism 
literature to develop a conceptual framework (Figure 1) testing four hypotheses. This framework 
uncovers how MNEs balance institutional tensions and complexities in governance regulations within 
and across economic environments. Specifically, emerging market MNEs overcome governance 
regulatory tensions between different economic environments and mitigate home country 
institutional weakness through isomorphism of governance institutions from the country with the 
most effective enforcement of normative governance guidelines, to countries with weak enforcement 
of governance regulations. Second, we provide the first empirical evidence using cross-listing 
(bonding hypothesis) and multinational directorship as avenues for governance isomorphism which 
enhances home country CG practices. In this regard, we show that cross-listed MNEs disclose high-
quality national CG practices as required by the home country CG code, relative to non-cross-listed 
MNEs. More so, MNEs with foreign directors improve their home country CG disclosures practices 
compared to those without such representations. 
 
 Third, we also extend the substitutability and complementary governance bundle research to 
multinational organisations. Extant CG literature suggests that firms do not choose a governance 
mechanism in isolation, but given the costs and benefits of each governance mechanism, firms chose 
governance practices as a bundle ( see Aslan and Kumar, 2014, Schiehll et al., 2014, Yoshikawa et 
al., 2014 for detail discussion ). This has led to debate on substitutability and complementary of 
governance structures, popularly referred to as national governance bundle NGB  within CG 
literature.  However, this area of enquiry is relatively new and existing literature is limited to single 
country firms Castro et al., 2013, Yoshikawa et al., 2014).  By 
testing this emerging discussion using foreign directorship and cross-listing as MNE governance 
structures, we reveal the circumstances under which they can be chosen as compliments or 
substitutes. We show that, whilst cross-listing and MNDs may be employed by MNEs as 
complementary strategies, in the presence of other firm-level factors such as cultural distance, MNEs 
may also use both mechanisms as substitutes. Specifically, MNEs may adopt institutional 
isomorphism strategy by choosing to recruit MNDs to bond with foreign CG systems and overcome 
institutional voids at home, rather than cross-list due to the possible costs associated with the latter.  
We contend that the choice of engaging in either (or both) strategies depends on effectiveness, costs 
and benefits of each.  
 
Finally, we evidence that MNEs do not only cross-list and appoint foreign directors to enhance 
institutional isomorphism, but also adopt these strategies to promote local isomorphism of domestic 
stakeholder governance practices. Specifically, emerging economies have customised governance 
regulations to incorporate guidelines aimed at promoting affirmative stakeholder actions (Ntim et al., 
2012b). These institutionalised stakeholder governance guidelines act as responsiveness to prevalent 
local realities. As such, show more contrast with those of host countries than those aimed at promoting 
shareholder value creation. Some authors claim that firms disclose and comply more with 
shareholder-oriented guidelines which has direct impact on economic returns of firms (Ntim et al., 
2012a),  and less with stakeholder guidelines. However, affirmative action stakeholder guidelines 
may not have a direct impact on firm performance but are essential to show local isomorphism 
(Salomon and Wu, 2012). For example, the requirement to disclose policies to counter corruption 
which is endemic in Nigeria (Adegbite, 2015, Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014) in addition to disclosure 
of policies and opportunities for HIV/AIDs and  physically challenges persons, may not have a direct 
impact on firm performance but non-compliance may inflict social, environmental and  political cost 
both nationally and internationally. This indirectly impacts on the  operations and performance.  
We also note some of these guidelines (presented later in Table 1) are in stark contrast with those of 
host countries. We thus examined whether MNEs strategically engage in the disclosure of such 
institutionalised stakeholder governance requirements using cross-listing and foreign directorship 
and our results are in the affirmative. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical framework 
and hypothesis. Section 3 discusses the context of our research. Section 4 presents discussions of 
methods. Section 5 discusses results. Section 6 presents theoretical contributions and managerial 
relevance. Finally, section 7 provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
 
Institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Meyer and Rowan, 1977) has hitherto been 
applied to research various aspects of CG and IB with varying degrees of contributions to literature 
(see for example Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008, Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2017, Fainshmidt et al., 
2016, Gaur et al., 2014, Greenwood et al., 2011). The institutional isomorphism perspective suggests 
that firms are subject to powerful institutions which constrain their activities. This subsequently 
results in similarity in organizational practices across different institutional environments (Pache and 
Santos, 2010, Greenwood et al., 2011, Gaur and Delios, 2015). Institutional isomorphism  arises from   
policies, rules and regulations (i.e. formal institutions) as well as cultural norms and traditional values 
(i.e. informal institutions) in different countries which influences firm operations (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983)
practices (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2017, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Haveman, 1993), and 
pressure from roles and 
directors duties (Greenwood et al., 2002).  
 
We draw on this literature to examine how emerging market MNEs engage and improve national 
CG practices through institutional isomorphism. We contend that MNEs with operations in more than 
 (Mingo et al., 2018). Such conflicts 
between the demands of home and host countries institutional environments have a significant impact 
on MNEs CG practices. In addition, recent IB research suggests that MNEs are required to comply 
with varied CG requirements in both home and host countries (Cumming et al., 2017, Pache and 
Santos, 2010). Such variations underpin the present study as they allow us to leverage institutional 
isomorphism perspective to uncover how MNEs engage with home CG regulations, notwithstanding 
their multinational dimensions. Considering this observation, the present paper sets out to examine 
how Nigerian MNEs manage conflicting demands between home country governance institutions and 
those of overseas jurisdictions where they have operations.   
 
Specifically, some emerging economies, including Nigeria, have recently adopted codes of CG 
practices intended to safeguard stakeholder interests. Such CG codes are customised to meet country 
level needs, and thus differ from country to country (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010,pp.490). Thus, given 
the heterogeneous nature of emerging economies institutional environments (Gaur et al., 2014, Gaur 
and Lu, 2007, Salomon and Wu, 2012, Xu and Shenkar, 2002), CG requirements in various countries 
where MNEs operate may occasionally be non-uniform, or even contradictory. Considering these 
observations, we argue that country-level variations in CG disclosure requirements and non-
uniformity may shape MNEs disclosure practices in home and host countries. 
 
More so,  extant literature argues that home countries of emerging market MNEs are characterised 
with weak enforcement of formal governance laws (Meyer et al., 2009) but strong informal practices 
which make it difficult for the former to be effective (Berkowitz et al., 2003). For example, rampant 
corruption has been identified as serious hindrance to ethical corporate conduct and effective CG 
implementation in Nigeria (Adegbite, 2015, Nakpodia et al., 2016). The possible consequences of 
engaging in corrupt practices in the long-run objectives of an MNE operating in developed economies 
with strong regulatory penalties suggest the need for overcoming informal institutional constraints. 
Such institutional parameters may make it difficult for emerging market MNEs to actively compete 
with global rivals especially when competing with firms from developed economies with strong 
regulatory enforcement. We argue that, to be competitive in the global market, emerging market 
MNEs must develop strategies to overcome institutional weaknesses within home countries.   
 
In this paper, we theorize that emerging market MNEs overcome both weak institutional 
enforcement of governance guidelines and reconcile inconsistent CG regulations between home and 
host countries through institutional isomorphism. This subsequently leads to governance 
isomorphism. We define governance isomorphism as diffusion resulting either from firms importing 
or exporting governance practices from one country to another. Drawing on this, emerging market 
MNEs embark on institutional isomorphism strategy which ensures the diffusion of normative 
governance practices from countries with stricter regulatory enforcement to emerging markets with 
weak regulatory institutions (as will be discussed later, most of the listed MNEs examined in this 
study are cross-listed in developed markets and majority of foreign directors also come from 
developed economies). Accordingly, emerging market MNEs employ isomorphic governance 
practices which enhances diffusion of good governance practices through cross-listing (external 
mechanism) and recruitment of foreign directors (internal mechanism) into boardrooms. Using 
Nigeria as an example, Figure 1 shows the conceptual framework which theorises how 
internationalisation of emerging market firms (MNEs) leads to diffusion of good governance 
practices to the home country through governance isomorphism. 
 
From Figure 1, overseas cross-
institutional isomorphism which leads to diffusion of CG practices across MNEs home and host 
countries. By cross-listing (H1 and H2) and employing foreign directors (H3 and H4) from countries 
with more robust CG systems, Nigerian MNEs import best practices of CG from their overseas 
jurisdictions of operation (i.e. from left-to-right of the framework). 
 
Fig. 1: Conceptual framework of MNEs governance isomorphism process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Good governance practices adopted from host countries do not only improve home country 
governance practices, but also counteract informal institutions (e.g. corruption, tribalism, elitisms) 
that impede home country governance practices (i.e. dotted line between home country governance 
practices and informal institutional practices). On the other hand, Nigerian MNEs may 
transmit/export good governance practices when they cross-list in countries with weaker governance 
institutions (i.e. from right-to-left of the framework). 
 
The remaining parts of this section operationalises the above conceptual framework to develop 
testable hypotheses. 
 
Cross listing constitutes an important strategic node of entry and legitimization of MNEs in 
host countries. Through cross listing, coercive regulatory powers of host countries can impact on 
emerging market MNEs behaviors at home. We use cross listing as an external bonding mechanism 
that enables isomorphism of governance practices between home and host countries. Consequently, 
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we contend bonding leads to diffusion of more stringent CG disclosure practices from host countries 
to home countries with weak enforcement institutions.  Hence improving MNEs governance 
disclosure practices in the home country.   
 
The bonding hypothesis of Coffee Jr (2002) suggests MNEs in developing countries with 
weak legal institutions, design strategies aimed at gaining the confidence of investors. Based on this 
premise, cross-listing, as a governance bonding strategy, avails managers of MNEs an opportunity to 
show investors commitment to more stringent CG disclosure regulations (Coffee Jr, 1998, Coffee Jr, 
2002). Similarly, MNEs may cross-list as a bonding mechanism to show stakeholders their 
commitment to overcome weak regulatory enforcement and institutional quality at home by taking 
advantage of foreign CG listing regulations which improve firm-level CG quality in the home country 
(Temouri et al., 2016).  
 
Similarly, bonding hypothesis suggests cross-listing enables managers of  MNEs with a 
bonding mechanism to build trust with investors and demonstrate their commitment to sound CG 
disclosure practices. This also  assist in bypassing informal institutions in the home country and may 
increase market valuation in both home and host markets (Siegel, 2009). Therefore, cross-listing 
avails MNEs the opportunity to benefit from CG regimes in countries of secondary listing (e.g., 
MNEs cross-listed in the USA or UK markets may benefit from strong CG regulatory enforcement). 
This, in turn, improves MNEs CG disclosure practices. As such, the bonding hypothesis suggests 
MNEs cross-list as a bonding mechanism with more demanding CG disclosure requirements ( see, 
Charitou et al., 2007, Coffee Jr, 2002, Lel and Miller, 2008) which enhances home country CG 
disclosures. Ceteris paribus, bonding hypothesis posits since cross-listed MNEs may be subject to 
strong investor protection regulations in host markets, they will have better CG disclosure practices 
than their non-cross-listed counterparts. Construing from bonding hypothesis, cross-listed MNEs are 
subject to more rigorous CG requirements, which enhances their ability to comply with home country 
CG regulations. 
 
Notwithstanding, critics of bonding hypothesis argue the costs associated with bonding 
activities, such as cross-listing, outweigh the benefits of enhance CG practices (Gozzi et al., 2006, 
Gozzi et al., 2008, Licht, 2004). According to Licht (2004), the main reasons for cross-listing includes 
access to cheaper sources of finance and enhanced visibility of the issuer (the cross-listed firm). Licht 
(2003;p.142) argues that, improvement in CG practices is a second-order consideration, whose 
objective is either to deter issuers of shares from accessing better-regulated markets or encouraging 
market regulators to allow foreign issuers of shares to avoid more demanding CG regulations. 
Similarly, Leuz (2006) contends that, the quality of cross-listed firms CG disclosure practices does 
not suggest bonding hypothesis as cross-listed firms, especially in the USA, are allowed considerable 
flexibility in preparing their financial reports. Sun et al. (2015) further notes that, outward movement 
of MNEs, through cross-listing, can be in part; an escape route from burdensome CG regulations. 
Consistent with the latter argument, MNEs may escape onerous domestic CG regulations through 
cross-listing, suggesting that such firms may be less likely to comply with home CG regulations. 
 
Even so, studies which have investigated cross-listing and firm economic performance nexus 
have demonstrated consistency with the bonding hypothesis. For example, for cross-listed firms 
originating from countries with weak investor protection, scholars have reported larger stock 
reactions (Miller, 1999), higher firm valuation (Doidge et al., 2004), increased financial analysts 
scrutiny (Lang et al., 2003), better environmental information (Bailey et al., 2006), increased access 
to external finance (Reese and Weisbach, 2002), and termination of CEO due to poor performance 
(Lel and Miller, 2008). In contrast, other studies have shown ineffectiveness of bonding hypothesis. 
For example, Siegel (2005) found that US CG laws are rarely enforced against cross-listed firms. 
These studies have contributed in our understanding of the significance of cross-listing across various 
dimensions but have so far not examined how emerging market MNE cross-list as a strategy to bond, 
promote governance isomorphism and enhance governance disclosure practices in the home country.  
 
We contribute to advance extant literature by uncovering cross listing (bonding) as a channel 
for institutional isomorphism (governance isomorphism) of governance practices across countries 
which leads to enhanced governance disclosures in emerging economies. We fill this gap in literature 
using insights from an interesting and unique institutional environment  Nigeria. Prior research has 
reported (e.g. Litvak, 2007) that firms from poorly regulated economies cross-listed in developed 
markets experience higher benefits than costs due to better credit ratings, due to compliance with 
more stringent laws. Therefore, emerging market MNEs cross-list to align their CG and disclosure 
practices with those of overseas markets, which may have more stringent governance institutions than 
those required by home regulators. Consequently, cross listing subjects MNEs to foreign governance 
requirements which may be costly but more stringent than those of the home country. MNEs have 
the choice to adopt these more stringent governance regulations or reject them. However, the latter 
choice may not be in the interest of emerging markets MNEs because it subjects them to possible 
penalties, political costs and possibility of losing cognitive legitimacy in the host country.   
 
 We argue that coercive pressures in country of secondary listing pushes MNEs to comply 
with governance regulations in the host country. This leads to various benefits including legitimacy, 
mitigation of liability of foreignness, access to government contracts and societal resources in 
addition to avoiding penalties from host country regulators. For example, it may be more challenging 
and costlier for cross listed MNEs in Nigeria to comply with the requirements for majority of board 
members to be independent (e.g. in UK and South Africa), or appointment of senior independent 
director (e.g. UK). This is because Nigerian SEC code recommends boards to be composed of one 
independent director but no requirement for senior independent board member. However, compliance 
with this governance requirement due to coercive pressures in the host country improves compliance 
with Nigerian governance laws and may lead to adoption and diffusion of international good 
governance practices to Nigeria. Consequently, bonding leads to isomorphism of good governance 
practices from host to home country. Therefore, cross listed Nigerian MNEs will have more robust 
governance practices compared to non-cross listed MNEs. More so, experience in adopting onerous 
governance requirements in countries of secondary listing which may be costly and in contrast with 
those of home country suggest, cross listed emerging market 
less demanding home country governance practices.  
 
Furthermore, home countries of emerging market MNEs are characterized by weak 
governance institutions which leads to weak enforcement of governance regulations (institutional 
voids). Consequently, formal governance regulations may contrast informal practices in the home 
country. For example, the Nigeria SEC requirements for firms to develop anti-corruption policies and 
code of ethics are in contrasts with a culture of rampant corruption (Adegbite, 2015, Adegbite et al., 
2012, Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012, Osemeke and Adegbite, 2016). This is evident from the number 
of corporate scandals linked to corruption, including the 2007 Cadbury Nigeria and the 2008 
Halliburton scandals (Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012). The tradition of corporate corruption in Nigeria 
is attributed to failure of regulatory authorities to enforce laws and regulatory guidelines. The weak 
regulatory enforcement allows elites and politicians to coerce firms to adopt unethical practices which 
limits the adoption of instituted governance regulations (Nakpodia and Adegbite, 2018). This 
institutional void and negative informal institutions pose a significant challenge to emerging market 
MNEs who potentially suffer from negative preconception especially from investors and stakeholders 
in host countries. Therefore, emerging market MNEs have to trade-off between formal and unethical 
informal governance institutions.  
 
Emerging markets MNEs overcome this paradox through cross-listing in other capital 
markets (especially in developed markets) which allows them to bond to more stringent CG 
regulations. Bonding improves and reinforces home country CG regulations. Specifically, due to their 
experience, cross-listed emerging market MNEs are aware of the disadvantages they face in their 
international operations due to perceptions of powerful influences of negative home country 
institutional practices (e.g. corruption, fraud, elitism) and weak regulatory enforcement. For example, 
the 2007 Cadbury Nigeria, 2008 Halliburton and 2009 Siemen scandals had an adverse effect on the 
reputation, valuation and legitimacy of these firms in countries where they are cross-listed. 
Accordingly, emerging markets MNEs are likely to adopt good governance practices from countries 
of secondary listing which limits the likelihood of engaging in negative informal practices and avoid 
the adverse effects this may have on their market valuation, reputation and legitimacy in the host 
country. This enables cross listed MNEs to bypass weak enforcement at home and limit the influence 
of informal traditions in circumventing compliance with home country governance regulations. 
Therefore, compared to non-cross listed MNEs, bonding enables cross listed MNEs to diffuse good 
governance practices from countries of secondary listing which enhances governance compliance in 
the home country. Thus, bonding leads to improvement of governance practices at home through 
governance isomorphism (see H1, from left to right as shown in figure 1). We therefore hypothesis 
that:  
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, MNEs that cross-list can mitigate institutional governance complexities, diffuse 
and improve governance disclosure practices, in line with integrated provisions of home country CG 
code, compared to MNEs that do not cross-list. 
 
As noted earlier, emerging economies have customised governance regulatory guidelines to 
incorporate provisions to enhance affirmative stakeholder actions (Ntim et al., 2012b). We contend 
these institutionalised stakeholder governance guidelines are in contrast with those of host countries 
compared to provisions with the purpose of aligning the interests of management and shareholders. 
For example, Nigeria SEC 2011 code requires firms to disclose policies to counter corruption and 
HIV/AIDS and other diseases. These provisions and other related stakeholder requirements 
(discussed later) are essential from a policy perspective to encourage local isomorphism of domestic 
stakeholder governance practices. Hence, we examine how MNEs engage with these governance 
practices.  
Drawing from legitimacy literature, cross-listed MNEs are better placed to disclose 
stakeholder requirements to reduce liability of foreignness (LOF), political, social and environmental 
costs. As such, MNEs international exposure to more stringent stakeholder requirements enhances 
compliance to home country affirmative action CG requirements. We thus posit that, due to their 
experience, cross-listed MNEs have strong incentive to provide disclosures regarding stakeholder 
inclusive practices as this indicates they are adapting to institutional peculiarities in both home and 
host countries. In this regard, through cross-listing, MNEs bond to stringent foreign stock markets 
institutional stakeholder requirements which helps improve home country stakeholder CG practices 
and disclosures. In doing this, they show investors and other institutional stakeholders (including 
central and local government, regulators, communities and employees) their commitment to 
providing transparent information, improving the lives of local people and promoting local 
isomorphism.  
 
On the other hand, cross-listing subjects MNEs to various stakeholder disclosure 
requirements of different countries, which may be potentially incompatible. Thus, cross-listed MNEs 
may choose not to apply specific country-level stakeholder CG requirements, due to concerns that 
disclosing such practices in other countries may be costly. For an instance, the requirement to adopt 
black economic empowerment (BEE) affirmative action in South Africa incorporated in King II CG 
code and enacted in the 2008 Companies Act suggests that a Nigerian MNE cross listed in South 
Africa must adopt these practices or incur political and social costs.  For example, Dangote cement 
company which is a family owned MNE will have to sell it shares at a discount to black South African 
investors to meet the BEE ownership threshold. This may affect the ownership of Dangote cement 
since regulations in Nigeria allows 100% of ownership by individuals and/or families.  But failure to 
adopt this affirmative action by Dangote cement may lead to high political costs because BEE 
compliance is linked to government contracts.  Therefore, cross-listed Nigerian MNEs must develop 
strategic responses to such conflicting stakeholder affirmative action demands, in order to gain 
legitimacy both in home and host country.  
 
More so, adopting formal stakeholder affirmative regulations for societal benefits may be 
detrimental to the pursuit of private benefits by politicians and powerful elites and hence they may 
resist and subvert the implementation of such practices. In addition, some of the stakeholder 
requirements in home countries may be in contrast with informal traditions.  For example, the 
requirement to disclose HIV/AIDS and other diseases policies and practices may contrast with 
informal norms of confidentiality and secrecy. On the other hand, failure to improve compliance with 
this regulation may be interpreted negatively by shareholders and stakeholders, in both host and home 
countries subsequently exposing the firm to economic, political and social costs. In addition, adopting 
this affirmative stakeholder governance guidelines will potentially make Nigerian MNEs more 
attractive to socially conscious investors, who may prefer to invest their money in firms that prioritize 
social good alongside financial earnings. This may enhance the reputational bonding of emerging 
market MNEs in host countries of cross-listing.  
 
We argue that emerging market MNEs are cross-listed in foreign markets with either implicit 
or explicit normative/formal rules governing stakeholder engagement. Failure to engage with these 
rules may lead to regulatory actions, political and social costs. In addition, these countries have strong 
non-governmental interest groups and stakeholders especially in the UK and USA, who may 
influence MNEs actions towards stakeholder engagement.  For example, a study by Bancel and 
Mittoo (2001) evidences that firms from Europe disclose more stakeholder information when they 
cross-list in the USA.  
 
We postulate that, to gain legitimacy, mitigate liability of foreignness, reduce political and 
social cost in host countries, cross-listing coerces emerging market MNEs to adopt and bond with 
stakeholder regulations which are more onerous and may be in contrast with home country 
requirements. In addition, host countries of cross-listing have stakeholders with different intensities 
of institutional pressure which improves their experience of dealing with stakeholder demands. 
Through bonding and experience of dealing with onerous stakeholder demands in secondary capital 
markets, compliance to less demanding home country affirmative stakeholder action is enhanced. We 
argue that cross-listing enhances local isomorphism in line with home country stakeholder disclosure 
requirements. Furthermore, cross listing enhances local isomorphism in line with home country 
stakeholder disclosure directly and indirectly through bonding to stringent foreign market norms, 
mitigate exposure to risk of litigation for non-conformity, reduce LOF (especially in countries like 
UK and USA) and access to critical government contracts (especially in South Africa).  This coerces 
MNEs to reconcile, adopt, diffuse and improve affirmative stakeholder governance practices between 
home and host countries compared to non-cross-listed MNEs.  This consequently leads to 
isomorphism of stakeholder practices of cross listed MNEs and improves engagement with 
stakeholder regulatory practices in the home country compared to non-cross listed MNEs (see H2, 
from left to right as shown in figure 1).  Hence, we hypothesis that; 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, MNEs that cross-list mitigate institutional governance complexities, diffuse and 
improve governance disclosure practices, in line with stakeholder provisions of the home country CG 
code, compared to MNEs that do not cross-list. 
 
 
IB literature has discussed the significance of hiring multinational directors (MNDs) to 
enhance board advisory, monitoring and resource capabilities. This is because, working in home and 
host countries avails MNDs first-hand knowledge of international markets (Adams et al., 2010, 
Giannetti et al., 2015, Hahn and Lasfer, 2016, Masulis et al., 2012). Consequently, MNDs develop 
and tap from their contacts and experience in international markets to advice firms and improve on 
CG practices. Following from Adams et al. (2010), Masulis et al. (2012), we observe that MNEs 
employ MNDs because they can provide valuable information and support to MNEs operations and 
CG practices in both home and host countries. As MNEs move into international markets, they face 
both LOF and liability of newness (LON) in unfamiliar political landscapes, new regulatory 
requirements, institutional environments, cultural and social norms (Li et al., 2016, Masulis et al., 
2012). To reduce these uncertainties and to gain legitimacy in foreign markets, MNEs employ MNDs 
with knowledge of their home or regional economies. These directors also have close networks with 
local businesses, social and political clime.  Li et al. (2016) observe that employing MNDs is a 
legitimate strategy to enhance firm legitimacy in its international operations. Similarly, Dauth et al. 
(2017) posit that directors with transnational experience are less likely to use discretion in financial 
reporting. 
 
Foreign directors possess valuable cognitive competences that improve problem-
solving capabilities. In addition, MNDs can draw on their experience and knowledge to cope with 
CG complexities between home and host countries, and thus are likely to increase the quality of CG 
disclosures. Dauth et al. (2017;p.75) notes that, international directors are better placed to assess the 
probability of default, which enhances the accuracy of firm financial disclosures. We argue that 
MNEs employ MNDs because they are better placed to improve MNEs monitoring and advisory on 
CG disclosures. In addition, MNDs can potentially introduce new best practices in CG in the home 
country owing to their exposure to other governance institutions. Due to their international exposure 
and experience of different governance institutional environments, MNEs employ MNDs because 
they can cope better with challenges originating in the home country institutional realities and CG 
landscape, eventually boosting MNEs CG disclosure quality.  
 
According to research findings by Oxelheim et al. (2013), Oxelheim , the 
inclusion of foreign directors from countries with Anglo-American CG system signals that an MNE 
is committed to transparency in CG disclosures. We suggest the appointment of at least one foreign 
director in the board of an MNE, especially individuals from countries with more robust CG systems 
and institutional environment, enhances the efficiency of the board and reduce home country 
institutional constrain. This consequently improves CG practices and disclosures in the home country. 
Similarly, from an agency theory perspective, international directors can curtail earnings management 
and managerial opportunism (Masulis et al., 2012). MNEs employ foreign directors to sit on their 
boards to provide the firm with strong monitoring, resources, and assurance of high quality reporting 
on CG practices. More so, due to their familiarity with different CG systems and institutional 
environment, MNEs employ MNDs because they can quickly understand other foreign CG standards, 
which assist in reconciling and improving on disclosure to the home country CG standards. Consistent 
with this antecedent, MNDs help to improve firms disclosure practices because they 
have greater knowledge and experience to detect and act on non-compliance with home country CG 
code. 
 
Nevertheless, other schools of thought have argued that MNDs are ineffective monitors.  For 
example, Knyazeva et al. (2010) argue there is substantial cost associated with foreign directors, due 
to the need to attend board meetings in home countries of MNEs. Accordingly, the geographical 
distance of foreign directors makes it costly and time consuming to attend board meetings. This may 
hinder their ability to effectively monitor, control and advice MNEs on CG matters (Masulis et al. 
(2012). Masulis et al. (2012) contend that, it is easier for home directors to attend board meetings and 
contribute to monitoring of managers. This is because local directors do not have the burden of 
travelling and/or security concerns. Similarly, Hahn and Lasfer (2016) posit that local directors are 
more likely to have time and energy, as well as cheaper transportation to attend board meetings and 
monitor firm CG practices, compared to MNDs. In line with this rationale, directors from different 
countries may be less likely to have familiarity and knowledge of current CG developments/practices 
in the home country of MNEs. The absence of MNDs in the home country suggest they may be less 
acquainted with home country CG code, and as such less likely to monitor its compliance.  
 
The preceding discussion indicates that foreign directors may bring a mix of benefits and 
costs to firms. Likewise, some studies have reported this mix impact. For example, Masulis et al. 
(2012) reported that MNDs make better cross-border acquisition. Similarly, the findings of 
and Nisar (2016) demonstrate, boards members with diverse nationalities positively affect firm's 
international market operations and operating performance. On the other hand, Masulis et al. (2012) 
findings show MNDs have poor board meeting attendance, less sensitivity in linking CEO turnover 
to performance,  high CEO compensation, high likelihood of intentional financial misreporting and 
poorer firm performance. Similarly, Hahn and Lasfer (2016) reported that foreign directors are 
associated with few board meetings and lower shareholder returns. We contend that despite the 
concomitant benefits and costs associated with MNDs, their overall effect on disseminating good CG 
practices from one country to another remains an interesting empirical gap to examine.  
 
Accordingly, our paper is unique from existing CG and IB literature which has mainly 
examined the impact of MNDs on economic returns, or board meeting attendance. We provide new 
insights by measuring the direct impact of MNDs in reconciling national CG and international 
governance complexities. We thus contribute to comparative institutionalism perspective in IB and 
CG scholarship from a less discussed institutional context  Nigeria. Specifically, we contend that 
MNEs are aware of the need to conform to regulatory and normative rules of doing business in 
different countries of operation. Therefore, MNEs employ MNDs due to their expertise, exposure 
and experiences of different governance institutions and environments to assist in overcoming 
institutional void whilst reconciling and improving home country CG disclosure practices.  For 
example, international directors are less likely to involve in corruption practices. More so, the 
presence of MNDs on corporate boards limits the ability of powerful elites and politicians in 
subverting formal governance practices which leads to enhanced governance disclosures.  
 
 Furthermore, due to their experience of different governance institutions, MNDs are well 
placed to reconcile conflicting governance regulations between home and host countries. The 
difference between South Africa King III regulation for IT and black empowerment governances 
which is contrary to Nigeria SEC 2011 governance regulations serves as such an example. We 
contend that due to international experience, MNDs from South Africa can help to mitigate these 
differences by influencing firms to adopt these governance regulations to gain legitimacy in South 
Africa. Thus, MNEs that adopt these practices (albeit inconsistent with regulations in Nigeria) will 
have more enhance governance disclosures beyond those required by regulators in the home country 
compared to MNEs that do not. More so, because MNDs have experience of more stringent 
governance regulations in host countries, they are likely to transfer similar behaviors to the home 
country. In doing so, MNDs leverage their experience and knowledge of good governance practices 
from host countries and diffuse this practices to the home country. Finally, foreign directors from 
more advanced governance institutions may diffuse good governances practices to less advanced 
governance environments, especially when institutional differences between host and home countries 
are high (Miletkov et al., 2017) This leads to governance isomorphism between host and home 
country (see H3,  from left to right as shown in figure 1) and improvement of home country 
governance practices. Therefore, we hypothesize that; 
 
H3: Ceteris paribus, MNEs that employ multinational directors mitigate institutional governance 
complexities, diffuse and improve governance disclosure practices, in line with integrated provisions 
of the home country CG code, compared to MNEs who do not employ multinational directors. 
 
Besides, literature suggests that foreign directors of MNEs perform a critical role in 
safeguarding the interests of their stakeholders. As an illustration,  observe 
that MNDs can influence the quality of stakeholder CG disclosures, whilst arguing that director 
nationality is a significant yet distinctive source of individual directors competence. This suggests 
that directors originating from or having worked in CG environments with high stakeholder CG 
disclosure levels, are likely to require similar quality of disclosures in the home country especially as 
it encourages local isomorphism of stakeholder governance initiatives. Due to the resource links of 
foreign directors, knowledge and expertise in stakeholder requirements across different institutional 
environments, they are employed by MNEs to reconcile and improve stakeholder disclosure practices 
in the home country consequently showing adaptation to local realities in the home country. 
Moreover, MNEs employ MNDs due to their exposure and awareness of the need to conform to 
societal norms and overcome negative informal norms which are detrimental to the  operations 
nationally and internationally. Hence MNDs are better placed to use their experience from past 
interactions to monitor MNEs stakeholder CG practices in the home country and diffuse good 
stakeholder affirmative practices from host to home country.  
 
Furthermore, MNEs may encounter varied and sometimes inconsistent and or contradictory 
stakeholder CG regulations in different countries due to differences in economic institutions. We 
argue that this institutional variability makes it challenging and costly for MNEs to engage in 
stakeholder practices across different institutional environments. Accordingly, MNEs recruit non-
native directors who possess understanding of these institutional differences in stakeholder CG 
regulations across countries. These foreign directors bring their experience and expertise from host 
countries and across other economic institutions to overcome weak enforcement at home whilst 
encouraging local isomorphism by reconciling and improving on home country stakeholder 
governance disclosure.  Furthermore, MNDs have experience of dealing with different degrees of 
external and internal pressures to adopt a range of stakeholder governance inclusive regulations which 
are deemed as efficient in a specific national context.  This enhances MNDs ability to reconcile 
stakeholder governance pressures between host and home country and in the process, diffuse good 
governance practices from strong regulatory enforcement countries to countries with weaker 
regulations and enforcement (see H4, from left to right as shown in figure 1). This improves 
stakeholder governance disclosure practices of firms who employ foreign directors compared to firms 
who do not employ foreign directors. We hypothesis that; 
 
H4: Ceteris paribus, MNEs that employ multinational directors mitigate institutional governance 
complexities, diffuse and improve governance disclosure practices, in line with stakeholder 
provisions of the home country CG code, compared to MNEs who do not employ multinational 
directors. 
 
Nigeria provides an interesting context for this study because of various factors. First, Nigeria 
recently overtook South Africa as the biggest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa (Barungi, 2014). This 
thus makes Nigeria an attractive destination for foreign direct investment, and a prospective gateway 
and business potential. Second, Nigeria is the biggest producer of oil in Africa, and one of the largest 
oil exporting countries globally. It also has various other thriving economic sectors which dominate 
ment production, construction, sugar, manufacturing, 
telecommunication, financial and business services. This make
for investment, particularly to foreign investors seeking business opportunities in new frontier 
continuous supply of capital whose accessibility is dependent on satisfaction of providers of capital 
that, adequate safeguards for their resources are in place. Third, Nigeria has instituted pro-market 
reforms aimed at aligning the country with global economic order (Ahunwan, 2002). This includes 
liberalization of the banking industry and privatization of previous government-owned enterprises, 
with a view to encourage private investment and eliminate heavy state presence in markets.  
 
Furthermore, Nigeria has the highest population of all 54 African countries, and comprises 
people from over 500 ethnic tribes (Nakpodia et al., 2016). Such highly varied demographic and 
calls for firms to pay due regard to the cultural diversity in the country, as captured in its provisions 
as follows: 
should as much as possible promote strategic national interests as well as national ethos and values 
 (Nigeria SEC, 2011 , section 
28.1,pp.34). This implies with 
requirements in the home country. In addition, firms operating in remote regions of the country, or 
those inhabited by minority ethnic groups, are also expected to take affirmative action to enhance the 
welfare of communities living in their area of operations. Fifth, Nigeria suffers from serious socio-
economic challenges, which further complicate its business environment. For instance, rampant 
corruption in both the public and private sectors pose a significant challenge for firms operating in 
ruption as a 
 (Nigeria SEC, 2011 , section 28.2, pp.34). 
 
institutional fragilities, avail a unique setting for examining how MNEs with origin in countries with 
such challenging institutional backgrounds engage in national CG practices. This also provides a 
good opportunity for examining the consistency of theoretical predictions, developed mainly through 
research carried out in developed countries, within an emerging economy context. 
 
Finally, the SEC CG code of 2011 emphasises sustainable business practices by requiring 
firms to adopt triple bottom line reporting. The 2011 CG code also incorporates stakeholder and 
shareholder disclosure requirements, in addition to standard CG requirements, such as: risk-based 
internal audit, approval of non-
resolution, whistle-blowing procedures, insider-trading laws, CG committee, board evaluation and 
performance. In 
peculiarities, including: social, ethical, cultural diversity, corruption, strategies for HIV/AIDS 
management and other diseases, and environmental reporting. The latter disclosure requirements are 
likely to differ from those expected in other countries (discussed in the next sub-section) where 
Nigerian MNEs have operations, and or are cross-listed. As such, CG disclosure practices of  
in Nigeria are contingent on how they leverage and reconcile differences between SEC 2011 CG 
regulations and those of host countries to improve disclosure quality. 
 
The discussion in this section analyses key features of CG codes of countries where Nigerian 
MNEs have operations. Table 1 summarizes 
SEC 2011 CG code, South Africa 2009 King III report and UK 2010 Combined Code.  It provides 
context for examining how MNEs engage in national CG practices considering the potential 
differences, which exist between home-country CG provisions and those of overseas locations where 
they operate and are cross-listed. A closer look, therefore, into the way MNEs reconcile any such 
differences can shed light on how CG practices in the home country are impacted. South Africa and 
UK are the two countries where most Nigerian MNEs have operations and are cross-listed and serve 
as the main countries of origin of non-native directors serving on boards of Nigerian firms. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
As illustrated in Table 1, some CG requirements are common across all three countries CG 
codes. Such provisions include requirements for: (i) unitary board structure, (ii) majority of board 
members to be non-executive directors, (iii) separation of chair and CEO roles, (iv) internal audit 
function as well as an audit committee of the board and (v) self-regulation. These similarities serve 
as threshold criteria for legal and reputational bonding of Nigerian MNEs within cross-listed markets 
 South Africa and UK. This is because the respective countries corporate statutes, in addition to the 
CG codes, have certain requirements for companies listed in their stock markets. Besides, prospective 
investors are also likely to have minimum CG expectations for the firms they invest in, usually 
consistent with the state of CG in each country.  
 
unique and significant differences. For instance, as noted earlier, 
make stakeholder disclosures concerning how they address the major pandemics affecting the 
requirements, which require only disclosures about HIV/AIDs, while the UK 
CG code contains no such requirements. This presents an additional CG obligation for Nigerian 
-corruption efforts and employment 
of disabled persons. At the same time, none of the other two CG codes  South Africa 2009 King III 
Report and UK 2010 Combined Code  
code emphasizes the need for firms to treat all shareholders equally. This is important in protecting 
ownership of firms which is prevalent within emerging economies (Young et al., 2008). 
 
More  CG code deviates from South Africa 2009 King III and UK 2010 
Combined Code in its recommendations with regards to the composition and structure of boards of 
directors. -
executive director on boards. On the other hand, South Africa 2009 King III requires majority of 
directors to be independent non-executive directors, while UK 2010 Combined Code recommends at 
least half of the board. Also, South Africa 2009 King III and UK 2010 Combined Code recommend 
board chairs to be independent non-
South Africa 2009 King III and UK 2010 Combined Code, which recommend annual and triennial 
evaluation, respectively. Thus, Nigerian MNEs with international operations in South Africa and or 
UK are likely to have more independent boards and undertake external board evaluations relative to 
non-cross-listed firms. In this regard, Nigerian MNEs serve as important channels through which 
international best practices of CG are transmitted into the country, hence boosting national CG 
practices. 
 
ance policies as highlighted above, the 
country still suffers from poor management of firms. Notwithstanding the normative rules to 
encourage firms to adopt good CG practices, Nigeria has hostile and strong informal institutions 
which limits any attempt to encourage good governance practices (Adegbite, 2015). Weak, and lack 
of willingness to enforce normative governance guidelines re-enforces the prevalence of 
unscrupulous informal practices such as corruption with its negative concomitant consequences. In 
fact, weaknesses in enforcing normative governance guidelines has led to corporate failures in the 
past. For example, in 1995, several directors and CEOs of Nigerian banks were arrested for non-
performing loans that were allocated to themselves, their families and friends (Ogbechie, 2010). More 
so, bad CG practices led to corporate fraud and failure including the 2007 Cadbury Nigeria and the 
2008 Halliburton scandals (Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012). Indeed, poor CG has accounted for the 
failure of many firms in Nigeria.  
 
Albeit significant regulatory reforms in the past few decades, corruption continues to be the 
principal issue hindering effective governance practices in Nigeria. Informal institutions which do 
not encourage ethical conduct coupled with enshrined corruption have promoted bad governance 
practices which acts as an obstacle for successful implementation of CG regulations. It is imperative 
therefore to examine how institutional contingencies and interplay within the governance system in 
this context, affects MNE governance practices. Specifically, the issues 
and governance institutions represents an emerging market wide phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Hence, Nigeria provides an interesting context within emerging economies to understand how MNE 
develop strategies to overcome regulatory weaknesses at home whilst promoting good governance 
practices. We therefore use Nigeria as peculiar environment to explore how emerging market MNEs 
institutions whilst overcoming institutional disadvantages at home.  
 From the development of hypotheses, our sample exclusively consists of MNEs. Data for the 
independent and dependent variables were manually collected from the annual reports of the studied 
MNEs, and was obtained from respective company websites, Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSX) and 
Africa-markets.com. The data for control variables were collected from the annual reports and 
triangulated with those from DataStream. Data for cultural distance was extracted from Hofstede 
datasets. The study sample is drawn from 80 MNEs listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSX) for 
the period 2011-2015. The choice of 80 listed MNEs and five-year period was due to data availability, 
representativeness and completeness for all the listed firms included the study. More so, 2011-2015 
periods are suitable because the SEC 2011 CG in Nigeria was implemented before this period and 
therefore firm disclosure can only be measured in the post-implementation era. Moreover, five-year 
data set with both cross-sectorial and time series properties can assist in ascertaining if the perceived 
sectorial disclosures of MNEs are consistent over time. Finally, using listed firms and 5-year period 
is consistent with prior  studies, which have typically researched listed firms covering a 5-year period 
(e.g. Henry, 2008, Ntim et al., 2012b).   
 
To ensure a representative sample of the selected 80 listed MNEs, we first adopted a random 
quota sampling technique ensured a representative sample from all major industries as listed in the 
NSX. This generated a mixture of both small and large MNEs to increase generalization and reduce 
sample bias. The sample consist of 19% of MNEs which are cross-listed and 81% of MNEs which 
are not cross-listed. Similarly, 47% of the MNEs have at least one foreign director and 53% have no 
foreign director.  
 
Contrary to previous CG studies in Nigeria which have used only non-financial firms (e.g. 
Akinkoye and Olasanmi, 2014) or financial firms (e.g. Olayiwola, 2010), our study includes both 
financial and non-financial firms.  Whilst financial firms are argued to be subject to more scrutiny 
than non-financial firms, we included these firms in our sample for several reasons. First, financial 
firms represent more than a quarter of listed firms in Nigeria, and therefore represent a large segment 
of the corporate institutions in the country. Second, many financial firms in Nigeria have been 
involved in financial scandals and poor governance practices in the past. In fact,  poor CG and 
entrenched corruption levels are argued to have accounted for the failure of many financial firms in 
Nigeria (Ogbechie, 2010). For example,  several directors and CEOs of Nigerian banks were arrested 
for poor CG practices including allocating loans to themselves, families and friends (Ogbechie, 2010) 
which generated high stock of non-performing loans for these banks. More so, our preliminary 
analysis comparing whether any mean differences exist between financial and non-financial MNEs 
showed the absence of any statistically significant differences in firm level individualities. Finally, 
(as will be discussed later) we control for firm industry fixed effects to capture industry level 
individualities peculiar to financial firms. Table 2 summarizes the sample selection procedure. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 From table 2, the industrial composition of MNEs in the sample of 80 in descending order 
includes: 31 (17%) Financial firms, 16 (9%) firms from Consumer Goods /Agriculture industry, 12 
(6%) firms from Consumer Services and Health Care industry, 9 (5%) from Natural Resources/Oil 
and Gas/Utilities, 6 (4%) Industrials/Conglomerates firms and 6 (4%) from ICT/Real Estate industry.  
The total sample size constitutes 45% of listed firms actively trading in the NSX as at 31/12/2015. 
 
The composition of the selected listed MNEs includes firms listed in both developed and 
emerging markets. Approximately 19% of the MNEs sampled are cross-listed.  Most of the cross-
listed MNEs are quoted in London Stock Exchange (LSE) and Euronext Paris (26.5% each). This is 
followed by 20% in Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), 6.75% each in New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) and, SIX Swiss Exchange. In addition, 6.75% of the cross-
listed firms have listing in both LSE and Frankfurt Stock Exchange. We did not observe any cross-
listing switching behavior amongst the sampled MNEs (i.e. either to cross-listing or delisting in any 
foreign market) within the sampled period. Therefore, we do not expect possible fixed effects because 
of switchers. Majority of our sampled cross-listed MNEs are in the financial industry (46.67%), 
followed by industrial/conglomerate and natural resource/oil and gas with 20% each and 13.33% 
agriculture/consumer goods. ICT/real estate, health care and consumer goods have zero cross-listed 
firms.  
 
 In addition, the sample size includes 29% of MNEs operating in developed economies 
including UK, USA, France, Germany, Switzerland and Netherlands. 71% of the sampled MNEs 
have operations only in Africa (including South Africa, Ghana, Cameroon, Togo, and Sierra Leone). 
Amongst the MNEs operating in developed markets, 50% operate in UK, 24% in France, 9% each in 
USA and Germany and 4% each in Netherlands and Switzerland.  In relation to firms operating in 
African economies, approximately 51% have presence in South Africa. In addition, 60% have 
operations within the West African Economic Region (ECOWAS). Interestingly, all the sampled 
MNEs operating in developed markets also have operations in African.  Majority of foreign directors 
of above 70% are either from UK, US, France or South Africa.  By industrial split, 
agriculture/consumer goods had the highest percentage of foreign directors (27%) followed by 
industrial/conglomerate (22%), ICT/real estate (17%), health care and consumer goods (15%), natural 
resource/oil and gas (11%) and financials (8%).  
 
 The first dependent variable for our study is the Nigeria integrated CG disclosure index 
(NICGI) composed of 75 CG provisions required for listed firms to disclose as stated in the SEC 
2011 code of good practices in CG. In line with prior research which developed coding schemes for 
country level CG provisions (Ntim, 2013a, Ntim, 2013b, Black et al., 2006), we employed a binary 
s 
from a minimum of zero (0%) indicating no disclosure to 75 (100%) indicating full disclosure to SEC 
2011 code of good practices in CG. 
 
Similarly, for our second dependent variable stakeholder CG disclosure index (Stakeholder-
NICGI), composed of fourteen institutional inclusive actions stakeholder requirements of SEC 2011 
CG code, which is part of the 75 SEC 2011 CG disclosure provisions. These fourteen provisions 
capture stakeholder contextual provisions aimed at meeting the expectations of local stakeholders. 
 disclosure on: (i) HIV/AIDS and malaria, and other diseases; (ii) 
dealings with stakeholders (iii) outcome of stakeholder dealings; (iv) stakeholder communication; (v) 
health and safety; (vi) employment equity; (vii) board gender diversity; (viii) staff diversity and 
number; (ix) physically challenged persons; (x) social investment policy; (xi) laws and standards; (xi) 
dealing with environmental issues; (xiii) code of ethics; (xiv) corruption policy. Similarly, 
stakeholder provisions scores (Stakeholder-NICGI) vary from zero (0%) to 14 (100%). 
 
 
Our two proxies of MNEs governance structures include cross-listing and multinational 
directorship (MND). We define multinational directors (MNDs) as board members who are not 
nationals of the home country (Nigeria) but sit on the boards of listed firms in the home country and 
represent the multinational presence of MNEs in host countries. It is measured as the percentage of 
non-Nigerian nationals to the total board size. We measure cross-
 
 
 
of CG requirements of SEC 2011 CG code can be impacted 
by other variables other than our two independent variables. To avoid omitted variable bias, we 
controlled for several variables that can affect firm CG disclosure practices. First, considerable 
research in CG scholarship has shown association between CG disclosure and firm performance ( 
e.g. Henry, 2008, Ntim et al., 2012b), 
Capital Employed (ROCE).   
 
Differences in informal and formal institutions such as culture, norms and regulations 
between  home and host countries create both advantages and disadvantages to MNEs (Bhaumik et 
al., 2018, Contractor et al., 2016).  Specifically, we expect that MNEs operating in developed host 
countries have cultural distances, which may be more different from host countries in emerging 
African economies, which can introduce country fixed effects. We therefore control for difference 
between developed and emerging economy operations and listing. We control for developed market 
market otherwise zero. We observe that not all MNEs who operate in develop markets are cross-listed 
in these markets. Consequently, we control for developed market operation (DDM_Operation) with 
zero. Finally, we use Hofstede six dimensions of national culture and apply Kogut & Singh CD-index 
formula to calculate average cultural distance (CD). For MNEs with considerable operations in many 
countries, we select cultural distance of the host country with the highest cultural distance value. For 
example, if an MNE has operations in Cameroon and UK, and the CD in the latter is 2.263 and the 
former is 0.193, we select the CD value for UK. 
 
More so, firm size has been posited , to affect firm 
CG practices and hence we control firm size using total assets (TA) and sales growth (S-Growth). 
Furthermore, board characteristics is contended to affect how firms relate to CG disclosures (e.g. 
Ntim et al., 2012b) we hence control for board individualities using CEO duality (DUAL) and 
percentage of non-executive directors (NED). Firm gearing is hypothesized to be a substitute CG 
structure that reduces agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986) and can therefore 
substitute CG disclosure practices of firms. We hence control for gearing (GEAR). Recently, IB 
research (e.g. Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2016, Del Bosco and Misani, 2016)  has evidence that 
ownership structure influences disclosure practices of firms. We control for ownership structure using 
institutional and director ownership.  We measure institutional shareholding as the percentage of 
shares owned by institutional shareholders to the firm share value. Director shareholding is measured 
as the percentage of shares owned by board of directors to the firm share value.  
 
Literature suggests that the size of an audit firm is essential in determining CG systems, 
quality of annual reports and firm valuation (El Ghoul et al., 2016, Ntim, 2013b). We expect audit 
firm size (AFS) to impact on the quality of annual reports and CG quality. For example, larger firms 
tend to use big four audit firms who are perceived as trustworthy (El Ghoul et al., 2016). We control 
by top big four audit firms (i.e. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG and Ernst and Young), otherwise zero.  
Finally, consistent with prior research (e.g. Li et al., 2016, Ntim et al., 2012b), we posit that industry 
and firm year fixed effects impacts on  CG disclosure practices and as such control for both using six 
industry dummies (INDUS) and five year dummies (YD).  Table 3 summarizes our measurement of 
variables. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Over time, firms differ in opportunities and challenges, which they face. We therefore argue that 
MNDs and cross-listing dynamically impacts on MNEs compliance with national CG provisions and, 
may have simultaneous impact on each other and/or change over time. For instance, ceteris paribus, 
the need to comply with CG requirements or poor disclosure of CG provisions in a previous year may 
push MNEs to recruit foreign directors in subsequent years. In this case, CG disclosures causes 
increase in the recruitment of foreign directors. Therefore, examining the impact of MNDs on CG 
disclosures may generate bias OLS estimates. Our study addresses possible endogeneity problems by 
testing the degree to which our OLS estimates may be sensitive or not to bias interpretations.  
Consistent with prior CG studies (Roberts and Whited, 2012, Wintoki et al., 2012, Barros et al., 2013, 
Trujillo Ponce, 2013), we address this using 3SLS estimation. Specifically, before performing a 3SLS 
regression, we conducted a pooled OLS regressions to compare with results of 3SLS estimates.  
Hence our pooled OLS regression is stated as; 
 
CGIit  it 1MND it 2CROSS-LIST it 3DDML it + 4DDMO it 5CD it 6ROCE it + 
7TA it 8S-GROWTH it + 9DUAL it 10NED it 11GEAR it 12INST_SH it 13D_SH it + 
14AFS it nt=1 15 INDUSit + nt=1 16 YDit .      
 
Where CGI is the Nigeria corporate governance index (NICGI) and Stakeholder CG index 
(Stakeholder-NICGI) score. MND and CROSS-LIST are the independent variables; multinational 
directorship and cross-listing respectively. Dummy developed market listing (DDML), dummy 
developed market operations (DDMO), cultural distance (CD), return on capital employed (ROCE), 
total asset (TA), sales growth (S-GROWTH), CEO duality (DUAL), percentage of NEDs (NED), 
gearing (GEAR), institutional shareholding (INST_SH), director shareholding (D_SH), audit firm 
size (AFS), industry dummies (INDUS) and year dummies (YD) are the control variables.  
The use of single equation regression models as specified in equation 1 above may lead 
to spurious coefficients due to interdependence between variables (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996, Beiner et al., 2006). The existence of two MNEs CG structures in this research depicts 
that the use of one structure may be dependent on complementary or substitute use of the other 
to be effective.  We note that cross-listing of MNEs may lead to the recruitment of MNDs and 
vice-versa. Or MNEs may choose to recruit MNDs to bond to foreign CG institutions rather 
than to cross-list. This suggests MNEs can complement or substitute the two mechanisms. 
Therefore, a mixture of the two MNEs governance variables may lead to maximization of 
optimal CG structures that improves CG disclosures.  More so, there may be possible 
interdependence between our dependent and explanatory variables. For example, the need to 
improve CG disclosure can coerced MNEs to cross-list or recruit MNDs. 
 
We employ a 3SLS method used by prior research 
and Nisar, 2016, Ntim et al., 2015a, Zellner and Theil, 1962). We derive a system of two 
simultaneous equations that allows simultaneous interdependencies between cross-listing, 
MND and CG disclosure by permitting each of these variables to simultaneously affect each.  
To be certain that 3SLS is appropriate, we use Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to first examine the 
existence of endogenous simultaneous links between MND, cross-listing and CG disclosure 
(see Beiner et al., 2006 for detailed discussion of the process). The results reject the null 
hypothesis of no endogeneity at 1% Hence, we developed the following two 
simultaneous equations with MND and cross-listing as dependent variables in equation 2 and 
3 respectively.   
 
MND it =  it 1 2CROSS-LIST it + 3CNI it 4BUSY it + 5DDML it + 6DDMO it 
7CD it 8ROCE it + 9TA it 10S-GROWTH it + 11DUAL it 12NED it 13GEAR it + 
14INST_SH it + 15D_SH it 16AFS it nt=1 17 INDUSit + nt=1 18 
YDit )     
 
CROSS-LIST it  it 1 CGIit 2 MND it + 3BSZ it 4SGL it 5CETHICS it 6DDML 
it + 7DDMO it 8CD it 9ROCE it + 10TA it 11S-GROWTH it + 12DUAL it 13NED it 
14GEAR it 15INST_SH it 16D_SH it 17AFS it nt=1 18INDUSit + nt=1 19 
YDit ... ..      
 
   To conduct a 3SLS, we need to find instrument (s) that correlates highly with foreign 
directorship and cross-listing respectively but are uncorrelated with CG disclosure except 
through the variables we have controlled for in our estimation ). In the 
context of this study, economic reasoning suggests there could be varied factors that impacts 
the behavior of foreign directors.  Extant literature suggest director interlocks (networks) can 
enhance the practices of firms  al., 2010, Ntim et al., 2015b).  
For example, directors interlock with other firms may improve their knowledge, human and 
social capital which can act as resource to boardrooms. Hence foreign directors interlock can 
impact on their knowledge and expertise. Thus, our first instrument for foreign directorship is 
MNDs interlock with boards out of the home country.  We contend that cross national interlock 
(international interlock) provides foreign directors with human capital from host countries and 
or other countries of directorship. Hence, we control for MND average cross-national interlock 
(CNI).  
 
Our second instrument is director meeting attendance (BUSY).  IB research has shown 
that, due to their non-presence in home countries, foreign directors have low board meeting 
attendance. For example, Masulis et al. (2012) show a negative association of MNDs and 
meeting attendance. Conversely, if MNDs attend board meetings, they can contribute more to 
boardroom discussions and will be able to impact on the firm CG practices.  Therefore,  MNDs 
may be enthusiastic enough to overcome the challenges of distance and attend board meetings 
. This is because board meeting attendance means MNDs will 
have the opportunity to monitor and share information with the board. Hence, we expect a 
positive relationship between MND meeting attendance and foreign directorship. Contrary to 
 and Masulis et al. (2012) who measured board meeting attendance 
with one indicating less than 75% attendance (non-attendance) in year, otherwise zero 
(attendance); we measure attendance with a value of one  indicating 75% attendance and zero 
indicating non-attendance.  
 
Cross-listing is instrumented by two variables, that is, host country corporate ethics 
(CETHICS) and sales growth (SGL). Extant literature has shown  the level of business ethics 
in a country influences firm corporate practices (Licht, 2004). Similarly, good corporate system 
enhances firm listing laws and encourages ethical behavior of firms (Lel and Miller, 2008). 
More so, strong ethical standards in a country attracts rather than repel firms to cross-list.  We 
measure country of secondary listing corporate ethics using World Economic Forum (WEF) 
Global Competitive Index (GCI) values for corporate ethics. We hypothesise that corporate 
ethics in the country of secondary listing affects regulatory severity on listed firms and will 
attract foreign firms especially emerging market firms who wish to bond with stringent 
corporate ethics. Second, sales growth in a host country motivates firms to cross-list to make 
their presence stronger and improve market share which increases revenue generation. For 
example, increase in aggregate demand from a host country implies a higher asset price which 
provides firms with incentive to list in the host country (Portes and Rey, 2005). We measure 
sales growth in country of secondary listing as year-on year sales growth.  
 
However, for our selected instrument to be considered as valid instruments for MNDs 
and cross-listing, they need to meet two econometric conditions. First, they should sufficiently 
correlate with MND and cross-listing. For example, corporate ethics and sales growth in 
country of secondary listing should strongly correlate with cross-listing whilst cross-national 
interlock and foreign director meeting attendance should correlate highly with MND. From the 
correlation results in appendix 1, the selected instruments correlates strongly with each of the 
respective instrumented variables.  Second, the instruments should not correlate with the error 
terms in equation one. Specifically, SGL and CETHICS can only correlate with governance 
disclosure through its impact on cross-listing.  Similarly, CNI and BUSY must not correlation 
with governance disclosure except via MND. Appendix 1 shows no correlation between the 
instruments and the error terms indicating that the second order condition is met. Hence, we 
can use these variables in respective estimation of equation 2 and 3.  In addition, we conducted 
Hansen-Sargan test to check for over identification and examine if our included instruments 
meet the exclusion restriction condition.  Our results show they do with p-values greater than 
0.35 which suggest we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our instruments for both equations 
are exogenous.  
 
Consistent with prior research  
2013a, Ntim et al., 2015a, Ntim et al., 2015b), we include governance disclosure, our 
independent variables of interest (cross-list in equation 2 and MND in equation 3) plus controls 
in equations 2 and 3 respectively.  Specifically, MND is predicted by the two instrumental 
variables in addition to CG disclosure, cross-listing and control variables in equation 2. On the 
other hand, cross-listing is predicted by the two instrumental variables, CG disclosure, 
multinational directorship, board size and extraneous variables in equation 3.  
 
Descriptive and correlations statistics are reported in table 4 and 5.  Table 4 shows descriptive 
and correlation results between all variables. Whereas table 5 shows comparative descriptive 
for both the quality of integrated CG disclosures (NICGI) and the quality of stakeholder CG 
disclosure (Stakeholder-NICGI) between cross-listed and non-cross-listed MNEs and MNEs 
with multinational directorship (MND) and those without MNDs.  
[Insert Table 4 and 5 about here] 
The descriptive results in table 4 shows that on average, listed MNEs in Nigeria 
disclose or comply with approximately 71% of SEC 2011 CG code with minimum disclosure 
of 16% and maximum of 99%.  This shows a wide variation in CG disclosure among the 
selected firms. Similarly, firm disclosure to stakeholder provisions (Stakeholder-NICGI) show 
mean disclosure of approximately 66% with a maximum of 100% disclosure and a minimum 
of zero disclosure (0%). This suggest that, despite the increasing trend to meet stakeholder 
expectations, some listed Nigerian MNEs do not involve in stakeholder engagement practices 
whereas others are in full compliance to the expectations of SEC 2011 CG code of good 
practice. As noted earlier, average cross-listing indicates that 19% of MNEs in the sample are 
cross-listed. The average presence of multinational directors indicates that 15% of Nigeria 
boards are made up of foreign directors with a maximum of approximately 71%.  This result 
indicate that, except for USA, the average presence of foreign directors in Nigerian boards is 
higher than those reported by   for 30 countries in including 
South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe. This suggests that listed MNEs in Nigeria on average 
employ more foreign directors than most firms in developed and developing economies.  
 
Comparatively (table 5) and shown on figure 2, both cross-listed and non-cross-listed 
MNEs show an increasing trend of quality CG disclosure (NICGI) in Nigeria from 2011-2015. 
However, cross-listed MNEs show higher quality CG disclosure than non-cross-listed MNEs 
with average disclosure of 82% for the former compared to 69% for the latter with significant 
(p< .001) mean variation of 12.92%. These higher quality CG disclosures recommend cross-
listing as a bonding strategy chosen by MNEs to manage governance complexities and improve 
CG disclosure practices in the home country. 
Fig 2:  
Disclosure to Nigeria CG regulation (NICGI) between cross-listed and non-cross listed MNEs  
 
 
Similarly, as shown in figure 3, cross-listed MNEs show similar high average 
disclosure than non-cross MNEs with respect to quality domestic stakeholder affirmative action 
CG disclosures with a mean of 87.86% compared to 60.87%. Both groups show significant (p< 
.001) mean variations of 26.99%.  
 
Fig 3:  
Disclosure to affirmative action stakeholder CG regulation (Stakeholder-NICGI) between cross listed and non-
cross listed MNEs 
 
 
Akin to cross-listing, MNEs with multinational directorship (MND) disclose higher 
quality CG practices (NICGI) than MNE without such representation (see figure 4). On 
average, MNEs who employ MNDs disclose or comply with approximately 74% of SEC 2011 
CG provisions whereas MNEs with non-MNDs disclosure is at 69% with statistical significant 
(p<.001) difference of 5%.  
 
Fig 4:  
Disclosure to Nigeria CG regulation (NICGI) between MNEs with multinational directors and non-multinational 
directors
 
 
 
 Interestingly, as shown on figure 5, MNEs who employ MNDs comply (disclose) with 
approximately 71% of affirmative action stakeholder CG requirements (Stakeholder-NICGI).  
But MNEs who do not employ MNDs comply (disclose) with 60% of institutional stakeholder 
engagement in the home country with a statistical significant (p< .001) mean contrast of 
10.58%.  
 
Fig 5:  
Disclosure to affirmative action stakeholder CG regulation (Stakeholder-NICGI) between MNEs with multinational 
directors and non-multinational directors
 
 
 
Before we present our hypothesis testing results, we first discuss the results based on 
the interdependence between MND, cross-listing and CG disclosure as summarised on table 6. 
To begin with, both NICGI and Stakeholder-NICGI significantly and positively affects cross-
listing and multinational directorship suggesting that they are complements. Ceteris paribus, 
increase in corporate governance disclosure improves cross-listing and multinational 
directorship. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Interestingly, in the presence of other firm level individualities including cultural 
distance, MND and cross-listing show an inverse relationship indicating that, MNEs may use 
both mechanisms as substitute.  This suggest that, ceteris paribus, MNEs may strategically 
chose to recruit MNDs to adopt governance isomorphism practices across economic 
environments rather than cross-list due to the costs associated with the latter.  Accordingly, 
MNEs can chose any of the mechanisms to export good CG practices and improve on home 
country CG disclosure depending on which is more effective, less costly and beneficial.  
Finally, MND and cross-listing show significant dependence on secondary listing in developed 
markets and cultural distance.  This implies, MNEs listing in developed market is a strong 
factor determining MNEs ability to cross-list and or recruit foreign directors. Similarly, as 
cultural distance between home and host countries increases, MNEs are more likely to employ 
international directors and secondary list in the host country.  
 
Results for our hypotheses are reported in table 7. The results of our regression of 
interest: 3SLS estimation are reported in column 2 and 3, while pooled OLS estimates are 
reported in columns 4 and 5 respectively.  Model 1 shows the effect of MNDs and cross-
listing on the CG disclosure index (NICGI). Model 2 reports the impact of MNDs and cross-
listing on stakeholder CG disclosure index (Stakeholder-NICGI).  Specifically, NICGI is the 
dependent variable in Model 1 and test hypothesis 1 (cross-listing-NICGI association) and 
hypothesis 3 (MND-NICGI association).  Model 2 test hypothesis 2 (cross-listing -
Stakeholder-NICGI association) and hypothesis 4 (MND-Stakeholder-NICGI association).   
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
As hypothesized, cross-listing has a significant positive impact on the quality of 
integrated CG disclosure of MNEs.  The effect is statistical significant (p<0.001) in the 3SLS 
estimate. This significant result is consistent with those reported for pooled OLS estimates 
(column 4). This therefore supports hypothesis 1 suggesting that; ceteris paribus, cross-listed 
MNEs due to bonding with secondary market CG requirements, are associated with and 
committed to high quality country level CG disclosure as required by home CG laws. Similarly, 
cross-listing impacts positively and significantly on domestic stakeholder governance 
requirements.  This result is robust across 3SLS (column 3) and pooled OLS (column 5) 
estimates and significant at 1% (p< .001). This finding supports hypothesis 2 indicating that 
cross-listed MNEs are committed to increasing domestic stakeholder governance disclosure. 
This implies by bonding through cross-listing in foreign markets with strong institutional 
stakeholder engagement requirements, governance isomorphism improves home country 
stakeholder inclusive requirements. It also suggests that cross-listing enables MNEs to adopt 
institutional stakeholder governance practices. 
 
Similar to cross-listing, we hypothesized that MNEs employ multinational directors 
(MNDs) (due to their broader knowledge, experience and expertise of different institutionalized 
CG systems) to reconcile and improve CG disclosure whilst overcoming institutional voids in 
MNEs home country. This preposition is supported with statistical significance (p<0.05) for 
our 3SLS estimation (column 2). The 3SLS result is similar to the significant results reported 
for pooled OLS estimate in column 4. Hence hypothesis 3 is supported suggesting that MNEs 
due to their international operations employ foreign directors who possesses expert knowledge 
of CG practices from different economic institutions/context to enhance MNEs home country 
CG disclosure practices and bypass home country institutional constrain. Similarly, the positive 
significant impact of MNDs on affirmative stakeholder CG requirements for 3SLS (column 3) 
supports hypothesis 4. This result is consistent with those reported for pooled OLS (column 5) 
estimate. The significant impact of MNDs on home country stakeholder CG provisions 
indicates that, though MNEs operate in different countries with sometimes contradictory 
stakeholder CG requirements; they recruit foreign directors who are experienced, 
knowledgeable and experts of different institutional stakeholder CG practices. These foreign 
directors leverage these skills to reconcile differences across economic environments and 
improve on MNEs home country stakeholder CG requirements. 
For robustness, even though 3SLS improves the efficiency of 2SLS as it controls for 
cross-correlations in the residuals of equations 1 to 3, for confirmatory purposes, we re-
estimated our results using 2SLS and our findings remain unchanged (see columns 4 and 5 on 
appendix 2).  
  Furthermore, some scholars have observed that CG research results are plagued with 
endogeneity problems (e.g. Lu et al., 2009, Schultz et al., 2010, Pham et al., 2011, Di Miceli 
da Silveira et al., 2010, Roberts and Whited, 2012, Wintoki et al., 2012, Barros et al., 2013). 
As emphasized by Wintoki et al. (2012), it may not be possible for  scholars to observe whether 
causation between variables as reported in CG scholarship based on OLS and 3SLS estimation 
is dynamic given that  past values of the dependent variable can impact on future values of 
independent var -
specific heterogeneity, it does not control for sensitivity to present and past firm specific 
peculiarities.  For example, poor disclosure with home CG regulations in a previous year may 
coerced MNEs to cross-list as a bonding mechanism to more stringent CG environment and or 
recruit foreign directors to improve subsequent disclosures. This may introduce dynamic 
endogeneity in OLS and 3SLS estimation.  
 
To ensure our results are not sensitive and are robust to this form of endogeneity, we 
re-estimated equation 1 using Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell 
and Bond (1998) dynamic system GMM which has been shown (e.g. Flannery and Hankins, 
2013,pp.16) to be more robust in controlling for dynamic endogeneity, unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity and second order serial correlation. Dynamic system GMM 
estimation (shown in columns 2 and 3 on appendix 2) confirms our reported results and suggest 
our findings are robust. 
 
We have demonstrated in this study that MNEs strategically cross-list and recruit multinational 
directors to improve the quality of country level integrated CG disclosure and affirmative 
stakeholder practices through governance isomorphism. Our results indicate that, through 
bonding with country of secondary listing governance institutions, MNEs diffuse governance 
institutions which improves governance disclosure in the home country. We show cross-listed 
MNEs disclose higher quality CG practices than non-cross-listed MNEs. In addition, due to 
their expertise, experience and knowledge of good CG practices from other economic 
institution, multinational directors can mitigate institutional governance complexities, diffuse 
and improve home country integrated and domestic stakeholder CG practices.  Finally, we show 
that MNE that employ MNDs disclose more quality home country CG practices compared to 
MNEs that do not employ MNDs. 
 
 
Our study makes several important contributions to IB and CG literature.  First, 
majority of CG studies have investigated CG-firm performance nexus ( e.g. Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 2012, Dahya Castro et al., 2013, Goncharov et al., 
2006). As such limited attention has been devoted to MNEs, which are significantly different 
from single country firms in that, they are faced with different CG regulations in different 
countries, which may be conflicting with those in their home country (Gaur et al., 2014, Gaur 
and Lu, 2007, Meyer et al., 2009). Drawing on institutional isomorphism, we develop a 
theoretical framework and test four hypotheses for analyzing how MNEs mitigate governance 
complexities at home and abroad (see figure 1). Our suppositions provide opportunities for 
further development of institutional isomorphism perspective within IB and CG scholarship. 
Specifically, we show that emerging market MNEs adopt institutional isomorphic practices 
from countries with strong governance regulations to emerging markets with weak enforcement 
of governance practices (governance isomorphism) (H1 and H3). Specifically, emerging 
market MNEs transmit good governance institutions to emerging economies while bypassing 
informal institutions at home through recruitment of foreign directors and cross-listing in 
countries with more stringent governance regulations (from left to right on our conceptual 
framework i.e. figure 1).   
 
Second, emerging economies have developed governance guidelines beyond 
shareholder value maximization to incorporate institutional and societal needs. We note that 
MNEs do not solely use cross-listing and foreign directorship to enhance institutional 
isomorphism but also to promote local isomorphism (Salomon and Wu, 2012) which shows 
local adaptation with domestic stakeholder CG practices. Specifically, emerging market MNEs 
manage competing institutional pulls in societal needs between home and host countries 
through secondary listing (H2) and nationality diversity in boardrooms (H4).  We contend that 
this local adaptation helps to reduce institutional weaknesses especially when institutional 
practices includes limiting unethical business conducts such as corruption.  More so, through a 
mimetic isomorphic process, local firms (that is firms operating only in the home country) may 
be pressured to adopt governance practices of MNEs especially when they see benefits of local 
adaptation to affirmative stakeholder actions.   
 
Third, our findings strengthen the theoretical understanding of bonding hypothesis and 
expand the works of other researchers ( e.g Bailey et al., 2006, Coffee Jr, 2002, Doidge et al., 
2004, Lang et al., 2003, Lel and Miller, 2008, Miller, 1999, Temouri et al., 2016). However, 
distinct from prior research, our findings move beyond the traditional cross-listing-firm 
performance association and offer new insights. Specifically, we conceptualize bonding as a 
mechanism for institutional isomorphism. We contend emerging market MNES use cross-
listing to mitigate governance complexities which allows diffusion of good governance 
disclosure practices from countries with stringent CG institutions to those with weak 
enforcement by adopting governance isomorphism strategies. This improves national CG 
disclosures of MNEs, especially within emerging economies with weak governance 
institutions. 
 
Finally, we extend IB and governance literature within the complementary and 
substitute debate on governance bundles. Complementary and substitute governance research 
has been limited to single country firms Castro et al., 2013, 
Yoshikawa et al., 2014). We contribute to extend this literature to include multinational firms. 
We contend that, there are costs and benefits associated with each MNE governance strategy.  
Accordingly, we show that both cross-listing and MND can be employed by MNEs as 
complementary and substitute strategies to enhance home country CG disclosure practices. We 
particularly demonstrate that, in the presence of firm and country level peculiarities including 
cultural distance, MNEs may use both strategies as substitutes. Our findings imply that, due to 
possible weak regulatory and enforcement of laws in emerging markets, their MNEs may 
strategically chose to recruit foreign directors to bond to more stringent foreign CG systems 
and institutions rather than cross-list due to the possible cost associated with secondary listing.  
Equally, MNEs can strategically select either of the two structures to bond and augment home 
country CG disclosures contingent on which is more effective, less costly and beneficial.  
 
 
Our study has managerial relevance for emerging markets MNEs that are continuously 
seeking to gain legitimacy in their operations (Gaur and Delios, 2015, Gaur et al., 2014, 
Temouri et al., 2016)  in host and home countries  with respect to their committed to 
transparency and practice of good CG.  Our results reveal that emerging markets MNEs can 
mitigate governance complexities at home and across different economic environments through 
governance isomorphism by bonding to more stringent governance institutions. This is an 
important strategy for enhancing MNEs CG practices in the home country and gaining 
legitimacy into their international operations. Furthermore, our study provides emerging market 
MNEs with incentive and motivation to employ foreign directors to combine with home 
directors to mitigate governance complexity while diffusing good governance practices to home 
countries with weaker governance enforcement. As our results suggest, appointing MNDs with 
knowledge and international experience can improve the quality of MNEs national CG 
practices.  In addition to adapting  MNEs can strategically 
leverage and reconcile institutional CG differences between home and host countries through 
cross-listing and appointment of MNDs.  Finally, our research evidences the ability for MNEs 
to substitute both strategies to improve CG practices. MNEs can chose either to cross-list or 
recruit foreign directors to improve home country CG practices depending on firm level 
individualities, cost/benefit analysis, effectiveness and relevance.  
 
 
Our research caveats suggest directions for future research.  First, while our theoretical 
arguments  are not context specific  with significant and robust results which should apply to 
emerging markets,  however, single country studies such as ours may limit cross country 
generalization (Sun et al., 2015). Further research can replicate our study in a multi-country 
comparative context  (Areneke et al., 2017). For example, comparative study on how South 
African and Nigeria MNEs engage in national CG disclosure practices using our two MNEs 
strategies (cross-listing and multinational directorship) is an empirical gap which would be 
interesting to explore. This will be helpful in validating our theoretical and empirical 
contributions.  
 
Second, comparing how emerging market firms engage in both host and home country 
CG requirements is also a potential area for research. Our study concentrates on how MNEs 
engaged in CG practices in the home country. However, comparative disclosure of MNEs host 
country CG requirements with those of the home country can increase our understanding of 
whether MNEs CG disclosure practices are consistent across economic environments.  
 
We have argued that institutions are important and each country  formal and informal 
institutions shape their CG regulations and practices. Consequently, we employ institutional 
isomorphism perspective and argue that MNEs are distinct from non-MNEs in that; they are 
expected to adapt to CG regulations in both host and home economies, which may be dissimilar 
and or contradictory to each other. More so, emerging markets MNEs face institutional 
constraints due to weak enforcement of formal institutions at home which perpetuates the 
prevalence of negative informal institutions. From this perspective, we develop and test four 
hypotheses and thereby uncover how MNEs bypass home country institutional weaknesses 
whilst adapting and reconciling different CG practices using home country CG disclosure 
requirement as a lens. 
  
 Our findings reveal two MNEs CG strategies namely cross-listing and multinational 
directors, as channels employed to bypass institutional constrains at home whilst ensuring they 
are complying and adapting CG practices in line with those required by home country 
regulators. This suggests that emerging market MNEs governance practices are mechanisms 
for institutional change. We contend these firms can encourage the emergence of new 
institutional governance practices through governance isomorphism. Accordingly, this positive 
influence on governance practices may generate institutional change in emerging economies 
which may reduce the burden of institutional fragilities whilst leading to co-evolution of 
governance practices and emergence of new resilient normative institutions. The theoretical 
framework and proposition we have developed and tested provide opportunities for continued 
understanding of how MNEs overcome institutional weaknesses, reconcile and improve 
national CG disclosure practices through cross-listing and appointment of multinational 
directors and are, agents of institutional change in governance practices in emerging economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 






  
 
 
 
 
 
 

Table 2:  
 
 
 
Table 3 
 Definition of variables and measurements
Industrial composition of companies 
available to be sampled 
No. of listed firms 
in each industry  
Percentage (%) 
of total 
population  
Final no. of 
stratified quota 
sample  
Final Sample 
percentage of total 
listed population  
 Final sample 
percentage (%) of 
industrial sample  
Financials  57 30.3% 31 17% 54% 
Industrials /Conglomerates  27 14.4% 6 4% 22% 
Natural Resources /Oil and Gas /Utilities  19 10.1% 9 5% 47% 
 Consumer Services /Health Care  34 18.1% 12 6% 35% 
Consumer Goods/Agriculture  33 17.6% 16 9% 48% 
ICT/Real Estate   18 9.6% 6 4% 33% 
Total population  188 100% 80 45%  
SEC 2011 CG disclosure variables (dependent variables) 
NICGI  
disclosure to 75 (100%) indicating full disclosure  
Stakeholder-NICGI 
indicating no disclosure to 14 (100%) indicating full disclosure.  
MNE governance variables (independent variables) 
Multinational Directorship (MND) Percentage of non-Nigerian board members to the total board size 
Cross Listing (CROSS-LIST)  
Control variables  
DDM_Listing (DDML)  
DDM_Operations (DDMO)  
Cultural Distance (CD) Measure of cultural distance based on application of Kogut & Singh CD-index formula using 
Hofstede six dimensions of national culture.  
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)  Percentage of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by capital employed. 
Total Asset (TA)  Firms total asset 
Sales Growth (S-GROWTH)  
sales  
Non-Executive Directors (NED) Percentage of non-executive directors (NED) to the total board size 
CEO Duality (DUAL)  
Gearing (GEAR) Percentage of total debt to total equity  
Institutional Shareholding (INST_SH) Percentage of intuitional shareholding to the total shares of a firm  
Director Shareholding (D_SH) Number of shares held by directors (both executive and non-executive) to the total shares of a firm as 
a percentage  
Audit Firm Size (AFS) 
 
firm is audited by top big four firms (i.e. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
  
 
Industry Dummies (INDUS) Six industry dummies for the classification of industry. Dummies includes: Agriculture /Consumer 
Goods (AGCG) ,  Financials  (FN) ,  Consumer Services / Health Care (CGHC),  Industrials 
/Conglomerates (IND) ,  ICT /Real Estate  (ICT) and  Natural Resources  /Oil and Gas /Utilities 
(NROL) 
Year Dummy (YD) Dummy variables representing each year of the sample period for 2011 to 2015 inclusive. 

Table 5  
Comparative corporate governance disclosure descriptive between MNEs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nigeria corporate governance disclosure index (NICGI) 
Variables Observations 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 All firm years Mean Comparison 
Non-  325 61.333 65.474 68.646 72.121 78.04 69.123 12.915*** 
 75 76 79.81 81.429 84.19 88.762 82.038 
Non- Multinational 
Directorships 211 60.854 66.1 67.444 71.848 77.47 68.743 5.000*** 
Multinational Directorship 189 66.797 69.867 73.697 76.089 82.243 73.737 
Nigeria stakeholder corporate governance disclosure index ( Stakeholder-NICGI) 
Non-  325 51.515 57.251 60.606 64.177 70.779 60.866 
26.991*** 
 75 79.59184 83.673 88.265 92.857 94.898 87.857 
Non- Multinational 
Directorship 211 50 56.785 58.928 63.265 71.062 60.008 10.580*** 
Multinational Directorship 189 62.543 66.964 70.779 73.809 78.746 70.568 
Table 6 
Determinants of MND and cross listing  
 
***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust mean square standard errors (RMSE) are in parentheses 
(). NICGI is the Nigeria corporate governance index composed of 75 provisions and Stakeholder-NICGI composed of the 14-
contextual stakeholder inclusive provisions-based SEC 2011 corporate governance code. DDM_Listing and DD_Operations are 
dummies for develop market listing and develop market operations respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES MND (equation 2) Cross listing (equation 3)
NICGI 0.686***  0.0207*** - 
 (0.0827)  (0.00229) - 
Stakeholder-NICGI - 0.508*** 
0.058 
- 0.0176*** 
(0.00214) 
Cross Listing -11.20*** -7.220** - - 
 (3.852) (3.660) - - 
Multinational Directorship (MND - - -0.00266*** -0.00532*** 
 - - (0.000897) (0.00106) 
Cross-national Interlock (CNI) 2.605*** 2.364*** - - 
 (0.116) (0.123) - - 
Board Meeting Attendance 9.835*** 9.556*** - - 
 (0.948) (0.917) - - 
Host Country Corporate Ethics (CETHICS) - - 0.0249* 0.0173 
 - - (0.0144) (0.0162) 
Sales Growth in Country of Secondary Listing (SGL) - - 0.0481*** 
(0.00697) 
0.0557*** 
(0.00780) 
DDM_Listing 9.524*** 4.157 0.545*** 0.437*** 
 (2.927) (2.793) (0.0475) (0.0546) 
DDM_Operations -0.745 -6.461** -0.119 -0.290*** 
 (2.619) (2.718) (0.0941) (0.101) 
Cultural Distance (CD) 0.765 2.132* 0.0114 0.0736* 
 (1.190) (1.210) (0.0369) (0.0415) 
ROCE -0.0177 -0.0359* -0.00121** -0.00202*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0198) (0.000560) (0.000637) 
Total Asset -1.84e-09 -3.74e-09 3.78e-10 3.72e-10 
 (8.84e-09) (8.91e-09) (2.56e-10) (2.76e-10) 
Sales Growth 0.0548*** 0.0461** 0.000674 0.000469 
 (0.0204) (0.0201) (0.000604) (0.000647) 
CEO Duality -16.26*** -23.90*** -0.637*** -0.980*** 
 (3.744) (4.162) (0.107) (0.137) 
Percentage of NED 0.0213 0.112*** -0.00114 0.00179 
 -0.778*** -0.671*** -0.0250*** -0.0286*** 
Board Size - (0.208) - (0.00716) 
 (0.0373) (0.0357) (0.00114) (0.00116) 
GEARING -0.0141 -0.0209 0.000942*** 0.000863** 
 (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.000334) (0.000361) 
Institutional Shareholding 0.0883*** 0.111*** 0.00333*** 0.00452*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0243) (0.000672) (0.000787) 
Director Shareholding 0.00182 0.0269 -0.000176 0.000612 
 (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.000512) (0.000541) 
Audit Firm Size -8.483*** -11.35*** -0.181*** -0.311*** 
 (1.221) (1.421) (0.0354) (0.0490) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included
Constant -24.47*** 16.04* -0.513*** 0.0506 
 (4.128) (9.395) (0.121) (0.127) 
Observations 400 400 400 400 
R-squared 0.682 0.448 0.312 0.119 
Table 7 
 Multinational directorship, cross listing and national governance disclosure relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust mean square standard errors (RMSE) are in parentheses 
(). Dependent variable in model 1 (NICGI) is the Nigeria corporate governance index composed of 75 provisions based on 
Nigeria SEC 2011 corporate governance code. Stakeholder-NICGI is the dependent variable in model 2 which composes of the 
14-contextual stakeholder inclusive provisions-based on SEC 2011 corporate governance code. DDM_Listing and 
DD_Operations are dummies for develop market listing and develop market operations respectively. 
 
 
         Appendix 1:  
         Correlations MND, cross listing, instrumental variables and standards errors   
 ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3SLS  
 Estimation 
 OLS  
Estimation 
VARIABLES (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 1) (Model 2) 
     
Cross Listing 19.10*** 18.31** 6.620** 8.704** 
 (6.398) (8.772) (3.034) (4.370) 
Multinational Directorship (MND 0.137** 0.321*** 0.179*** 0.350*** 
 (0.0542) (0.0747) (0.0462) (0.0665) 
DDM_Listing -12.90** -7.213 -4.929 -1.184 
 (5.101) (7.004) (3.160) (4.552) 
DDM_Operations 3.432 15.44** -0.440 10.33 
 (4.823) (6.645) (4.383) (6.313) 
Cultural Distance (CD) 1.001 -1.655 3.616* 0.806 
 (2.197) (3.028) (2.039) (2.937) 
ROCE 0.0393 0.0885* 0.0716** 0.119*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0459) (0.0306) (0.0440) 
Total Asset 1.60e-09 5.18e-09 -1.28e-09 -3.05e-09 
 (1.63e-08) (2.25e-08) (1.41e-08) (2.03e-08) 
Sales Growth -0.0672* -0.0749 -0.0283 -0.0348 
 (0.0357) (0.0493) (0.0326) (0.0470) 
CEO Duality 27.42*** 51.39*** 18.70*** 40.28*** 
 (6.233) (8.590) (5.662) (8.156) 
Percentage of NED 0.0428 -0.124 0.0763 -0.0687 
 (0.0662) (0.0913) (0.0597) (0.0861) 
GEARING 0.00993 0.0246 0.0265 0.0362 
 (0.0227) (0.0312) (0.0189) (0.0272) 
Institutional Shareholding -0.172*** -0.273*** -0.109*** -0.188*** 
 (0.0390) (0.0538) (0.0361) (0.0520) 
Director Shareholding 0.00612 -0.0407 -0.0220 -0.0775* 
 (0.0308) (0.0425) (0.0290) (0.0418) 
Audit Firm Size 8.895*** 17.87*** 9.028*** 18.49*** 
 (1.828) (2.519) (1.629) (2.346) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included
Constant 38.56*** 16.04* 42.44*** 21.59** 
 (6.817) (9.395) (6.488) (9.345) 
Chi2 169.94*** 331.31*** - - 
F-Stat - - 14.35*** 20.63*** 
R-squared 0.275 0.449 0.467 0.558 
Observations 400 400 400 400 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Multinational Directorship (MND)         
2. Cross Listing 0.196***        
3. Cross National Interlock (CNI) 0.913*** 0.191***       
4. Meeting Attendance (BUSY) 0.763*** 0.179*** 0.683***      
5. Sales Growth Secondary Listing 
(SGL) 0.107* 0.642*** 0.102** 0.088*     
6. Corporate Ethics (CETHICS) 0.363*** 0.660*** 0.297*** 0.301*** 0.424***    
7. NICGI_Standard Error -0.001 -0.019 -0.015 -0.013 -0.023 0.019   
8. STAKENICGI_Standard Error -0.003 -0.020 -0.003 -0.024 -0.056 0.023 0.853***  
 
 
 
            Appendix 2:  
Dynamic system GMM and 2SLS estimation of multinational directorship, cross listing and national governance disclosure 
relations 
***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust mean square standard errors (RMSE) are in parentheses (). Dependent 
variable in model 1 (NICGI) is the Nigeria corporate governance index composed of 75 provisions based on Nigeria SEC 2011 corporate 
governance code. Stakeholder-NICGI is the dependent variable in model 2 which composes of the 14-contextual stakeholder inclusive 
provisions-based on SEC 2011 corporate governance code. DDM_Listing and DD_Operations are dummies for develop market listing and 
develop market operations respectively. The Arellano Bond test statistic (AR1) and (AR2) follows an asymptotic normal distribution, with 
null (H0): No autocorrelation of order v in the differenced errors. By creation the residual values in first differences AR (1) can be correlated, 
however no serial correlation should exist in the second difference AR (2). The Hanson test of over-identification (J-Statistic) follows a chi-
squared distribution with (l-r) degrees of freedom with l indicating the number of moment conditions whereas r are the parameters to be 
estimated; with a null (H0) = moment conditions are specified correctly (i.e. instruments in the dynamic system GMM are valid).  Diff-in-
Hansen tests of exogeneity has a null (H0) = instruments in the system GMM equation levels are exogenous. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dynamic System GMM  2SLS Estimation 
 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
L. NICGI 
0.655*** 
(0.056) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
L. Stakeholder-NICGI 
- 
- 
0.598*** 
(0.078) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Cross Listing 
3.419*** 
(1.386) 
0.087** 
(0.042) 
18.92*** 
(6.530) 
17.07* 
(9.000) 
Multinational Directorship (MND) 
0.049*** 
(0.016) 
3.764*** 
(1.341) 
0.137** 
(0.055) 
0.319*** 
(0.076) 
DDM_Listing -2.750*** (1.326) 
-0.366 
(1.681) 
-12.79** 
(5.204) 
-6.375 
(7.173) 
DDM_Operations -0.862 (1.423) 
2.564 
(2.410) 
3.460 
(4.916) 
15.65** 
(6.775) 
Cultural Distance (CD) 0.462 (0.675) 
0.296 
(1.512) 
1.005 
(2.240) 
-1.627 
(3.087) 
ROCE 0.019 (0.023) 
0.102*** 
(0.038) 
0.0392 
(0.034) 
0.088* 
(0.047) 
Total Asset -0.000 (0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
1.73e-09 
(1.66e-08) 
6.07e-09 
(2.29e-08) 
Sales Growth 0.033* (0.018) 
-0.042 
(0.041) 
-0.067* 
(0.037) 
-0.074 
(0.050) 
CEO Duality 5.584* (2.989) 
10.898* 
(6.223) 
27.39*** 
(6.354) 
51.17*** 
(8.757) 
Percentage of NED -0.042 (0.033) 
-0.108* 
(0.064) 
0.043 
(0.068) 
-0.122 
(0.093) 
GEARING -0.005 (0.009) 
0.025 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.023) 
0.027 
(0.032) 
Institutional Shareholding -0.019 (0.018) 
0.037 
(0.028) 
-0.171*** 
(0.040) 
0.272*** 
(0.055) 
Director Shareholding 0.013 (0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
0.0062 
(0.031) 
-0.040 
(0.043) 
Audit Firm Size 4.835*** (0.939) 
8.331*** 
(1.482) 
8.894*** 
(1.863) 
17.86*** 
(2.568) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Constant 
21.888*** 
(3.543) 
18.093* 
(10.763) 
38.56*** 
(6.948) 
16.01* 
(9.576) 
F-Stat 129.65*** 129.65*** 11.67*** 22.73*** 
R-squared - - 0.276 0.450 
AR (1) test (p-value) .002 .002 - - 
AR (2) test (p-value) .811 .811 - - 
Hansen test of over-identification (J) (p-value) .775 .775 - - 
Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity (p-value) .998 .998 - - 
Observations 320 320 400 400 
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